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1. Introduction 
The new nations of the African continent are emerging today as the result of 
their struggle for independence. This struggle for freedom from foreign 
domination is a patriotic one which necessarily leaves no room for difference. It 
unites all elements in the country so that . . . these countries are led by a 
nationalist movement rather than by a political party or parties. The same 
nationalist movement, having united the people and led them to independence, 
must inevitably form the first Government of the new state; it could hardly be 
expected that a united country should halt in mid-stream and voluntarily divide 
itself into opposing political groups just for the sake of conforming to what I 
have called the ‘Anglo-Saxon form of Democracy’ at the moment of 
independence.  
Julius Nyerere, 19611 
This abstract from an article by Julius Nyerere, independence leader and first 
president of Tanzania, was written in February 1961 when the United Kingdom and 
Tanganyika2 were in the midst of the transition to independence. It is a clear 
representation of the political situation at the time. Independence movements 
suddenly had to form governments and gain both internal and external sovereignty. 
Nyerere argued for the need of a single-party state, and the creation of a uniquely 
African idea of democracy. This is a good illustration of the debate on democracy in 
Africa, which will be referred to throughout this thesis. 
In the early 1960s a wave of transitions to independence swept across the African 
continent. This was often done without consultation and participation of the 
populations in question. The national boundaries remained those of the colonies, 
artificial and uncalculated, this often resulting in unstable borders and situations ripe 
for ethnic conflict3. As a part of this process towards decolonisation the colonialists 
and independence leaders established democratic political institutions for the post-
independence period. The colonisers had not foreseen independence in the near 
future; therefore, the colonies were often not sufficiently prepared for self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 106. 
2 Tanganyika was renamed Tanzania following its union with Zanzibar in 1964. For continuity reasons 
Tanganyika will also be referred to as Tanzania throughout this thesis. 
3 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 290. 
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governance. Independence leaders had achieved widespread domestic support during 
the struggle for independence. This process had placed emphasis on independence, 
however, and not on installing the western style liberal democratic political 
institutions required for after independence. Thus, not long after independence many 
of these newly established institutions disintegrated into different forms of autocratic 
rule4.  
Tanzania’s post-independence political system rapidly changed into a one-party state, 
based on the principles of Nyerere’s African socialism. Elementary to Tanzania’s 
post-independence political system is the political national identity in this period, as 
will be argued in this thesis. The term ‘political national identity’ is a term conjured 
up for this thesis and refers to the politicisation and implementation of the nationalist 
identity by the ruling party and government. The basis of this political national 
identity was the nationalist movement and its creation of a nationalist identity. 
Theorists of nationalism have categorised nationalism as perennial, natural and fixed 
on the one hand, and constructed on the other. Ernest Gellner, for example, argues 
that the nation and nationalist sentiments are a product of modernity and that they are 
invented with the use nationalism as a political tool5. African nationalist movements 
can be categorised as constructed because they were a result of the modern 
independence movements and arguably were used by independence leaders as a 
political tool to mobilise widespread support. The African nations were created within 
imperialist demarcated borders. Tanzania’s post-independence ruling party 
successfully used this nationalist movement to create a political national identity; 
applied to legitimise rule and maintain political stability.  	  
The Tanzanian Independence Constitution signed in 1961 “provided for elected 
government, parliamentary supremacy, competitive multi-party politics and a liberal 
democratic political and juridical tradition”6. In 1962 this was replaced with the 
Republican Constitution of 1962, which introduced a presidential system and the 
president as the head of state; the president was no longer required to answer to 
anyone within government and arguably had absolute power. Furthermore in January 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Stephen Brown and Paul Kaiser, “Democratisation in Africa: Attempts, Hindrances and Prospects,” 
Third World Quarterly 28(6) (2007), 1131-1133 
5 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (London: Pheonix, 1997), 1-36. 
6 Mohabe Nyirabu, “The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania: The Dominance of the Ruling Party,” 
African Journal of Political Science 7(2) (2002), 100-101. 
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1963, shortly after becoming president, Julius Nyerere declared that the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) of the elected party, the Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU), had decided that Tanzania needed to become a constitutional single-
party state in order to sustain national unity and promote rapid economic 
development. In Nyerere’s view a multi-party political system was futile because 
there was no class conflict. Tanzania became an official one-party state in 1965. 
On 26th April 1964 Zanzibar and Tanganyika united to form the Republic of 
Tanzania. This was followed in 1977 by the joining of the political parties TANU and 
the Zanzibari Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, ‘Party 
of the Revolution’), re-establishing single-party rule7. CCM carried on with the 
socialist ideology, Ujamaa, to end social inequality, articulated in the Arusha 
Declaration and adopted in 1967. Nyerere emphasised the importance of social 
equality and the need for public participation, though this participation was limited 
and confined within the ideological boundaries of Ujamaa8. Furthermore, he 
continued to believe that this was best achieved through single-party politics; the 
nationalist movement had created unity in the objective of economic development and 
a multi-party system would in his view only increase unnecessary conflict. This was 
the beginning of the establishment of the Tanzanian political national identity, which 
shaped Tanzania’s democratic development and was influential in the development of 
democracy.  
This thesis will analyse how the creation of a political national identity has shaped 
Tanzania's democratic development, why this has occurred the way it has and whether 
this has assisted or hindered the eventual development of a multi-party system. It will 
outline the creation of a Tanzanian political national identity since the independence 
movement and the necessity to obtain internal political legitimacy in the immediate 
post-colonial period and how this has shaped the democratic system. 
To do this effectively it will first explore the post-independence academic debate on 
democracy in Africa, how this debate has evolved and how this has influenced 
thinking. Only with this understanding can a valuable analysis of the developments 
and its effects be made. In chapter two democracy is defined by looking at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Nyirabu, “The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania,” 100-101. 
8 Richard L. Sklar, “Democracy in Africa,” African Studies Review 26 (1983), 15-16. 
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western idea of democracy as well as critically analysing it against the African 
definition of democracy, in order to provide insight into the different theories and the 
extent to which the Tanzania political system can be termed a democracy. The 
existing political national identity is then outlined in chapter 3. This is an underlying 
element of the research questions and argumentation. Approaching the research 
questions with an appreciation of the discussion and theories on post-independence 
political systems, democracy, the ‘political national identity’ as well as the current 
political system will provide a starting point for analysis.  
Chapter 4 will then explore Tanzania’s independence movement and critically look at 
what influences, both internal and external, and which policies have shaped the 
political system and why. Chapter 5 will explore the creation of a political national 
identity through the formation of a national ideology and the one-party state. The 
internal and external influences and the formation of a nationalist ideology outline 
what impacted political decisions, the political system, the eventual political culture 
and why this occurred. Lastly in chapter 6 the evolving discourse in the 1980s will be 
discussed, placing this and the importance of the political national identity within the 
current political situation, and looking at whether this has assisted or hindered the 
development of a multi-party system.  
Therefore by starting with a solid understanding of the historiography this can then be 
used to analyse how the Tanzanian political national identity was used and influenced. 
Importantly, the current political situation plays a crucial role in determining whether 
this aided or hindered democratic development and the role the political national 
identity played. An overview of the current political system and situation is provided 
in the following paragraph. Interviews with Tanzanian academics and policy-makers 
provide insight into local viewpoints. Historical and current analysis will be combined 
to answer how and why the political system developed and whether this has 
influenced multi-party democracy. 
1.1 Tanzania’s current political system  
The deep-rooted and influential political national identity, created after independence, 
was part of TANU’s attempt to legitimise its rule both internally and externally. Its 
foundations lay in the establishment of an African socialist ideology with a single-
Julia Müller 
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party state system. As Paul Bjerk (2010) argues in his article “Sovereignty and 
Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of the African State” published in 2010, 
The passionate debate about Tanzania’s socialism highlights not successful 
policy, but rather successful politics. While “flag” sovereignty followed logically 
from independence, it was only with varying success that African countries laid 
claim to the exercise of internal and external sovereign authority. The debate that 
came with Nyerere’s socialist policies created as their context a robust sense of 
Tanzanian nationhood9 
Tanzania’s transition to multi-party democracy started in 1992 and was initiated by 
the ruling party. The end of the cold war and the rapid transition of autocratic states to 
democracies convinced Nyerere that this inevitable transition would need to take 
place in Tanzania. The 1980s was a decade of economic decline and Nyerere feared 
that the political instability in neighbouring countries would tip over into Tanzania. 
Donor pressure for liberal forms of democracy and civil rights further influenced his 
decision. Furthermore, to ensure the continued hegemony of CCM, Nyerere wanted to 
dominate the direction, timeframe and outcome of the democratisation process. 
Nyerere started the transition before any opposition was able to mobilise itself10.   
This top-down transition has had a number of consequences that are important for 
today’s political context. Although opposition parties were permitted to run for 
election, the separation of the state and party never thoroughly occurred, resulting in 
an uneven competitive advantage in favour of the CCM, hampering real political 
competition11. This created a political system midway between authoritarianism and 
democracy.  
Significantly, the constitution has been viewed as a main reason for CCM’s unfair 
political advantages and the de facto continuation of the one-party state. The 
Constitution of 1977 is still the underlying guideline for the country’s rule. It 
developed from the Independence Constitution of 1961, the Republican Constitution 
of 1962 and the Constitution of 1965. None of these were subject to public debate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Paul K. Bjerk, “Sovereignty and Socialism in Tanzania: The Historiography of an African State,” 
History in Africa 37 (2010), 277.  
10 Gero Erdmann, Guided Democratisation: Political Attitudes and in Tanzania (Bremen, 1995), 1-3. 
11 S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, “Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field,” Journal of Democracy 
21(1) (2010), 64. 
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during their creation. Moreover, other than the Independence Constitution, all 
emphasise centralised control for the President and executive branch of the 
government. The ruling party is categorised as the organisation with the highest level 
of authority in the country and independent organisations such as trade unions, civil 
societies and cooperatives are deemphasised. Additionally, the constitutions do not 
include a Bill of Rights; it only appeared in 1984. Crucially, only the ruling party can 
make modifications to the constitution.  
These versions of the constitution have further added to the linking of party and state 
because in a multi-party system the constitution normally includes national morals 
that can be applied by any ruling party. Instead of being in the national constitution, 
ideologies are normally reflected in the respective party constitutions. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Tanzania, however, is based on African socialism and 
Ujamaa; founded by CCM’s first leader and the country’s first president, Nyerere. 
This led to a call by scholars and opposition parties for the rewriting of the 
constitution when the transition to multi-party politics started in the early 1990s. This 
was, however, rejected by CCM, who only removed the articles that were 
immediately related to the one-party state. This has, still today twenty years after the 
establishment of multi-party rule, resulted in the political supremacy of the ruling 
party and the continuation of a deep-rooted political culture comprising the ruling 
party’s African socialism and single-party rule12. When in 1999 a ‘special presidential 
committee on constitutional reforms’ carried out a study it was found that almost 89% 
of Tanzanians associated with Ujamaa and did not want it removed from the 
constitution. Ujamaa remains a crucial instrument for CCM to use during elections.                                    
An additional factor that has not changed from the one-party state political system is 
the amount of power given to the president. Very few systems are in place to prevent 
the misuse of that power. The President is the head of state, head of government, and 
commander in chief of the armed forces. He appoints the district and regional 
commissioners, who implement government policy on a district and regional level, as 
well as the members of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), who coordinate 
the Presidential elections. Therefore both national and local decision bodies are under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Alexander B. Makulilo, “Unleveled Playfield and Democracy in Tanzania,” Journal of Political and 
Law 5(2) (2012), 96-100.  
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the control of the ruling party and president. As Julius Nyerere once stated “I have 
sufficient powers under the constitution to be a dictator”13.  
Therefore, Nyerere’s post-independent beliefs were installed deeply within society. 
Nevertheless, as social inequality increases parallel to rapid economic growth, 
religious conflict increases, the population’s education level improves, and corruption 
remains widespread, discussions on the need for change come up and evolve. At the 
start of his second term in 2010, President Jakaya Kikwete called for the revision of 
the constitution. The Constitutional Review Act was passed in March 2011, and due 
to amendments made to the act to monitor the procedure, the Constitutional Review 
Committee (CRC) was nominated in April 2012. The draft constitution was published 
for political opinion on 3 June 2013, and will be finalised in 2014. For the first time, 
public participation in writing the constitution was approved and encouraged with 
information and opinions collected from the public, opposition parties and civil 
society organisations.  
Sensitive and significant points under discussion included the state of the Union 
within the new constitution. Strong and at times conflict-ridden debates have taken 
place particularly on Zanzibar. The first vice president of Zanzibar and secretary-
general of the opposition party the Civic United Front (CUF) mentioned that during 
the collection of views by the CRC over 66% of Zanzibaris demanded full 
autonomy14. Another issue is the possible limiting of the powers of the Executive, 
with arguments being made for the parliament and other institutions to share some of 
the powers. Regarding executive powers Chief Secretary Ombeni Sefue contended 
that “a country as young as Tanzania, should not put much emphasis in reducing 
powers of the president. We need a powerful president so that he or she can use those 
powers to unify the country”15. Lastly, the review of the electoral system is still based 
on the one-party state 1977 Constitution. In a country in which the population, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Quoted in: Alexander B. Makulilo, “Unleveled Playfield and Democracy in Tanzania,” Journal of 
Political and Law 5(2) (2012), 99.	  
14 The Citizen Reporter, “Katiba Team Unveils First Draft Today,” The Citizen, June 3, 2013, 2.  
15 Quoted in: The Citizen Reporter, “Katiba Team Unveils First Draft Today,” 2. 
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particularly rural, has relatively little knowledge of the government structures it is 
crucial that the population is sufficiently informed of the process and what it entails16.  
The extent of change in the published draft constitution surprised many and has 
arguably pushed the boundaries for the change that was considered possible to the 
limit. Ujamaa as an ideological term has been removed, although the principles of 
self-reliance and exploitation central to Ujamaa remain, the ideological socialist 
aspect is no longer mentioned. Many Tanzanians wanted the term Ujamaa to remain, 
although CRC member and former Prime Minister Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim argued 
they were referring to its principles, which remained, rather than its ideological 
aspects17. Independent candidates are allowed to take part in the presidential elections, 
and the election results can be contested by opposing candidates. Crucially, the 
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly cannot have any political affiliations, 
ministers can no longer be members of parliament and the parliament needs to 
approve the ministerial nominations and nominations for the newly suggested 
Independent Electoral Committee nominations by the president.  It has been 
suggested that the Union becomes a three-tier government, with a Zanzibar, 
Tanganyika and Union government. Paramount is the reduction of the number of 
Union issues from twenty-two to seven18.  
The number of sensitive issues touched by the draft highlights the seriousness with 
which this has been approached by the CRC. Critics have argued, however, that the 
weaknesses of the draft constitution are that the terms democracy and development 
are not elaborated on. Furthermore, the President still has considerable power being 
able to elect member of the Independent Electoral Committee and supervising each of 
the governments of the three-tier Union. Importantly, the suggested three-tier 
government has received mixed reviews. The three-tier government has been seen as 
a compromise to one the one hand calls for autonomy in Zanzibar and on the other 
hand fears of a union breakdown throughout Tanzania. Professor Issa Shivji has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Laura-stella Enonchong, “Tanzania’s Constitutional Review: An Era for the Union?” University of 
Warwick, African Network of Constitutional Lawyers, February 2012, 
http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2012/07/tanzanias-constitutional-review-new-era.html. 
17 Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Constitutional Review Committee Member, interview by Julia Müller, Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania, June 5 2013.  
18 Rasiumu Ya Katiba Ya Jamhuri Ya Muungano Wa Tanzania Ya Mwaka 2013 (Draft Constitution of 
the Republic of Tanzania 2013), June 2013. 
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argued that this compromise will lead to conflict and will disrupt unity,19 echoing 
Nyerere’s response to the 1992 commission analysing multi-party politics that a three-
tier government would cause the collapse of the union because the Tanzania mainland 
government would in reality be stronger than the federal government20. This unity 
theme has been central within Tanzania’s political national identity. Furthermore, 
there are different opinions on whether the government and ruling party will allow 
significant change within the constitution. 
Nevertheless, there is a general feeling that political change is occurring, in addition 
to the constitutional review. Opposition parties have become more organised and have 
made better use of their resources. The main opposition parties include Chama Cha 
Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema), the Civic United Front (CUF), United 
Democratic Party, Tanzania Labour Party, the National Convention for Construction 
and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi), National League for Democracy (NLD), and 
the Pragmatic Democratic Alliance (PDA). Chadema, currently the largest opposition 
party, has seen an increase in MPs and, therefore, party resources. Their ‘Movement 
for Change’ has generated interest, particularly among the young relatively well-
educated urban population. Its resources are now also effectively being used in key 
rural areas in order to fight CCM hegemony among the villagers. Importantly, the 
majority of the country’s population, about 60%, is under thirty-five. The traditional 
focus on agriculture and development through hard work needs to be adapted to 
mobilise this new generation21. Both in the rural and urban areas a general want for 
change is developing, particularly among the younger generations. Conflict within 
CCM is further undermining its popularity. As Daniel Loya, Executive Director at the 
Tanzanian Center of Democracy has argued, in the last few years Chadema has 
effectively used the little resources it has, it has a strong leader in Dr. Slaa, and its 
‘Movement for Change’ is critical of government policy. Adding to that, the press is 
relatively free in Tanzania highlighted by a growth of new editors who add to critical 
political discussions. As economic growth continues to go unnoticed to a majority of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Aisia Rweyemamu, “Shivji: Three Governments will Kill this Nation,” The Guardian, June 22, 
2013. 
20 Juma Mwapachu, “The Union – The Jewel in Tanzania’s Crown,” The Citizen, July 21, 2013.  
21 Mwesiga Baregu, “The Dynamics of Political Change and the Restructuring of Governance in 
Tanzania,” in Reflections on the Transition to Democracy in Tanzania, ed. Research and Education for 
Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 2010), 9. 
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the population, CCM needs to sort out internal conflicts and polish up its image22. As 
stated in the Economist Intelligence Unit Tanzania Country Profile,  
“In the context of an increasingly confident Chadema, dissatisfaction with wages 
in the public sector and a stream of corruption allegations, the CCM has been on 
the back foot, stumbling from crisis to crisis and responding to events rather than 
shaping the agenda”23. 
Tanzania is in a period of social, economic and political change and political 
awareness is increasing. In order to understand this change, and the current de facto 
single-party state it is necessary to come to grips with Tanzania’s democratic history, 
its political national identity and how it has affected democratic development, why the 
political situation is as it is and how the transition to multi-party democracy has 
evolved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Daniel Loya, Executive Director Tanzania Center of Democracy, interview by Julia Müller, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, May 3 2013. 
23 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report: Tanzania,” Economist Intelligence Unit, (London: 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013), 3.   
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2. Democracy in Post-Colonial Africa 
2.1 Historiography of democracy in Post-Colonial Africa 
The development of democracy throughout Africa in the post-colonial period and its 
effects on the modern political situation in many African states has interested 
scholars, both western, referring to the scholars primarily based in Europe and the 
United States (US), and African, referring to scholars based in Africa. Grasping the 
historiography of African democratic systems, how the post-independence political 
developments were understood, and how these ideas developed gives a contextual 
overview that is critical for analysing later developments and comprehending how 
democracy has evolved. This provides an important basis for approaching the 
research questions.  
The debate on the altering of political systems in African countries has gone through a 
number of stages and can be separated into three main theories. The first theory is the 
modernisation theory, linking economic growth to democracy. The second theory is 
the ‘structuralist perspective’ stream, which emphasises structural requirements for 
democracy and includes the system or dependency theory. The third theory, named 
the ‘actor or strategy perspective’ emphasises actors and/or strategies as apposed to 
structures. Here, the role of political leaders and decision-making are given more 
importance than the political structure and economic structures, for example24. These 
theories form the basis for understanding the historiography of democracy in post-
colonial Africa and will be outlined below in terms of the different stages of thought 
in the decades following independence. 
During the 1950s and 1960s arguments emerged drawing a strong correlations 
between economic growth and democracy, the modernisation theory. This became an 
important foundation for how scholars, particularly western scholars, viewed the 
African situation and the potential future political situation. American scholars, 
including Seymour Martin Lipset and Philips Cutright, linked the economic situation, 
such as income per capita, industrialisation, the level of urbanisation and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 M. Bakari and S.S. Mushi, “Prerequisites for Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania,” in Democratic 
Transition in East Africa, Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) (Dar es 
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education level to political development and the stability of democracy25. Lipset 
argued in 1959 that the more economically developed a country, the more likely it 
was that the democratic system would persist. Under the modernisation theory every 
country moved along the same line of economic and political development, regardless 
of history, culture, geography. This movement was linked to economic growth and 
would result in democracy. The emerging African countries were, according to 
Lipset, more focused on nationalisation and economic development than the 
characteristics that make a liberal democracy. Therefore Lipset predicted that “given 
the pressure for rapid industrialization and for the immediate solution of chronic 
problems of poverty and famine through political agencies, it is unlikely that many of 
the new governments of Asia and Africa will be characterised by an open party 
system representing basically different class positions and values”26.  
Additionally, the structuralist theory, which emerged at the same time, linked 
economic, social and cultural structures to political development in the 
democratisation debate. The global economy and its built-in inequalities were used to 
explain the development of specific countries. Less developed countries were inflicted 
with dictatorships, termed ‘developmental dictatorships’, to deal with the 
repercussions of underdevelopment; these were historically inevitable27. Samuel 
Huntington, for example, argued in 1984 that the difficult predicament of fighting 
poverty meant, “the limits of democratic development in the world may well have 
been achieved”28. Underdevelopment could not be combined with liberal democracy. 
Furthermore specific cultural ideas and perspectives were required for democratic 
development, a culture that encompassed the fundamental ideas of democracy29. The 
modernisation debate and structuralist theory are pivotal to grasp because they 
influenced international views and ideas on post-independence political systems 
immediately following their establishment; there was no hope for African democracy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Rustow, D.A., “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2(3) 
(1970), 337-339. 
26 M.S. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review 53(1) (1959), 101-102. 
27 Richard L. Sklar, “Developmental Democracy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29(4) 
(1987), 686-688. 
28 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 
99(2) (1984), 218. 
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Understanding the historiography of democracy in post-colonial Africa, particularly 
written in the decades immediately after the end of colonial rule, is important because 
it gives context to current historiography and the current situation. In the early 1960s 
a large number of African countries established western-style democratic political 
systems following independence as part of the decolonisation process. In the post-
independent period scholars looked towards the newly independent African states 
with interest and intrigue regarding what was to come. Especially after it became 
evident that the disintegration of the western democratic institutions, Collier termed 
these ‘tutelary’ democracies, installed in the decolonisation period was a continent-
wide phenomenon30. Of the countries that gained independence between 1956 and 
1970, thirty-four became authoritarian at or soon after independence; only Botswana 
remained democratic31. As Aristide R. Zolberg stated in 1968, “the most salient 
characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless 
arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features”32. The rapid 
emergence of different forms of ‘authoritarian regimes’, whether military regimes or 
one-party states, led to a debate on the African universality, referring to the almost 
identical political paths taken by African countries following independence, in the 
creation of these authoritarian regimes33. This debate strengthened the structuralist 
argument of the 1960s and 1970s that African countries were lacking the required 
economic, social and structural prerequisites for a liberal democracy.  
In Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (1964) J.S. Coleman 
and C.G. Rosberg give strong arguments for the universality of African politics. 
According to them sub-Saharan Africa’s political institutions were predominantly 
single-party states or dominated by one party by mid 1960s, with a strong trend 
throughout the continent leading to either one of these options. Moreover, these 
similarities were in part a result of how the political parties came to be established, 
and as a result of economic and social changes in the colonial period. These changes 
included the creation of an educated elite; the discontent and torment towards colonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ruth B. Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing forms of Supremacy 1945-1975 (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1982), 22. 
31 Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa, 20. 
32 Aristide R. Zolberg, “The structures of political conflict in the new states of tropical Africa,” The 
American Political Science Review 62(1) (1968), 70. 
33 Ruth B. Collier, “Parties, Coups and Authoritarian Rule: Patterns of Political Change in Tropical 
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rule; campaigns established to improve life under colonial rule; and nationalist 
independence movements. Formal political parties were, however, not established 
until constitutional reforms were underway in the 1950s34. Constitutional reforms 
“provi[ded] for (1) the devolution by the imperial government of a sufficiently 
meaningful and attractive to induce or to provoke nationalist leaders to convert their 
movements into political parties and (2) the introduction or refinement of institutions 
or procedures, such as an electoral system, which would make it technically possible 
for parties to seek power constitutionally”35. The political parties were, therefore, the 
result of the colonial period and colonial policy adjustments. The argument that the 
transition from democracy in the 1960s and 1970s was a result of the unsuitability of 
democratic institutions became widespread36.  
Scholars gave several reasons for the widespread failure of the western form of 
democracy in African states. As Zolberg argued in 1968, in order to understand the 
political system in Africa “instead of viewing political disturbances as the shapeless 
ground surrounding institutions and processes which define the regimes of new states, 
we must try to view them as characteristic processes which themselves constitute an 
important aspect of the regime in certain types of political systems”37. The post-
independent African states were distinctive because of the lack of strong national 
centres of which the outskirts were until recently fairly independent, and social and 
economic underdevelopment. Importantly, the African states were an illustration of 
the colonial scramble for African territory. Previously unconnected societies with 
personal institutions and ruling systems were expected to interact politically as a 
nation-state under a single political system. The culture of the new political system set 
up by the new leaders did not, therefore, represent that of the entire country; ethnic 
groups with very different languages and cultures were placed together within forced 
unnatural boundaries38. Zolberg argues that many of the important aspects and 
structures of the traditional African political systems endured during the colonial 
period, even under direct rule, where the colonial power directly controlled the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical 
Africa, ed. J.S. Coleman and C.G. Rosberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 1-3.   
35 Quoted in Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, 3. 
36 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
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administration of the colony, where this was not permitted. The democratic structures 
needed were not present. 
Furthermore, changes within the political structures did not necessarily replace the old 
structures. African states were at independence very difficult to categorise as a single 
nation or society with one historical political system; the level of political 
homogenisation was limited at independence. The political institutions set up at 
independence were arguably artificial and never properly established, reflecting 
Collier’s ‘tutelary’ democracy definition. Furthermore, the ideas behind their 
establishment were never firmly integrated into the society; they remained a set of 
ideas on paper. These institutions inflicted upon newly independent states were an 
important reason for their fragility39.  
Historians have also focused on the type of colonial rule that preceded independence. 
Scholars argued that whether the colonisers practiced direct or indirect rule, where the 
colonial power used local rulers for example traditional chiefs to control the day-to-
day administration, affected the stability of post-independent states. This soon 
received less emphasis within the democracy in Africa debate, however, when it 
became clear that the distinction within colonies was not clear cut and the French 
often used chiefs whilst the British did not always used indirect rule40.  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s many scholars argued for a need to shift their 
opinion away from focusing solely on the universality of political institutions 
throughout Africa; important differences tended to be overlooked41. Many scholars 
moved away from the modernisation theory and ‘structuralist perspective’ and rather 
emphasised the ‘actor or strategy perspective’. Leaders, policy and institutions are 
important influences for democracy; scholars such as Linz, O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
Sorenzen, Karl and Schmitter, Linz and Stephan, and Przeworski argued this42. 
Dankwart Rustow led the debate that democracy did not require prerequisites such as 
a certain level of economic development already in 1970, hereby contradicting the 
modernisation debate. According to Rustow, “we need not assume that the transition 
to democracy is a world-wide uniform process, that is always involves the same social 	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40 Collier, “Parties, Coups and Authoritarian Rule,” 66. 
41 Collier, “Parties, Coups and Authoritarian Rule,” 65. 
42 Bakari and Mushi, “Prerequisites for Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania,” 33. 
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classes, the same types of political issues, or even the same methods of solutions”43. 
This opened up the possibility for in-depth analysis of individual democratic systems. 
Specific contextual historical, political and cultural differences could be analysed, 
which for countries such as Tanzania with a unique political national identity was 
essential in order to understand its political system.  
As post-independence states settled into their political institutions scholars 
distinguished between political ‘democratic’ systems as opposed to only emphasising 
autocratic rule. Autocratic rule, or ‘oligarchy’, and democracy were on different ends 
of the spectrum of idealised notions meaning intermediary theories of political 
structures in African states were required44.  Richard L. Sklar in “Democracy in 
Africa” (1983) argued that democracy in Africa “is as varied as the ever-changing 
forms of government in more than fifty sovereign states”45. By the late 1970s and 
early 1980s many of the African states were either already authoritarian regimes or 
had stabilised political systems that they themselves termed democratic. Unlike many 
scholars in the period immediately following independence, the shock of the failure of 
western democratic institutions had passed and the systems that remained became the 
centre of the debate on democracy in Africa. Sklar separated the African ‘democratic’ 
states into several categories; liberal democracy, guided democracy (multi-party 
electoral systems), and social democracy.46 
By early 1980 the majority of the liberal democracies, the first type of democracy, 
established by the colonial powers had disintegrated. Those that remained were 
Nigeria, Botswana, Mauritius, Gambia, and Senegal. The second type of democracy, 
guided democracy, is difficult to categorise as democracy. They do not have multi-
party elections, but accept that its leaders are accountable towards the population. 
Guided democracy is different from dictatorships because of this accountability. 
These included several systems with various ideological alignments, such as 
Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau and Zambia. The third type of democracy is social 
democracy. In theory socialism goes further than democracy and accountability, and 
aims to achieve social equality. Tanzania and its single-party state system, under 	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President Julius Nyerere is a prime example of social democracy, in addition to being 
an example of a guided democracy. Nyerere saw democratic involvement as 
fundamental for social equality47 but envisioned this solely within the socialist 
ideology. Therefore, multi-party elections were considered irrelevant in Tanzania. 
Instead competition within the ruling party allowed for sufficient democratic 
participation48. With different views of their needs and best way to move forward 
from each other as well as western countries, African states developed their own 
political systems that they saw as best suited. Sklar’s definitions create an opportunity 
to categorise African political systems into something other than either ‘liberal 
democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’, the middle ground or ‘gray zone’ can be analysed. 
In 1978 Collier argued that three of the most important factors in explaining the 
failure of democracy in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s are (1) party dominance; (2) 
party competition; and (3) the rapid increase in electoral participation49. Democratic 
institutions, universal suffrage and party politics were introduced rapidly and without 
much preparation. This contrasts with the manner in which electoral participation was 
introduced into for example, Western Europe50. An institutional vacuum was created 
after the departure of the colonialists51. This rapid transformation weakened the 
political situation because it led to a sudden demand for delivery and distribution of 
wealth, by the population and particular ethnic groups52. Leaders were faced with the 
pressure of legitimising their rule internally and meeting demands immediately 
following independence, which reflects the ‘sovereignty theory’ arguing that 
decisions made by political leaders were in search of legitimacy and political survival. 
Furthermore independence movements that fought armed liberation struggles usually 
became de facto leaders and became the first post-independence government. This 
resulted in a military authoritarian structure that from the start could not fit into the 
installed western democratic model. Additionally, in the last two decades scholars 
have emphasised the international situation in which the post-independence states 
were born. Most states were immediately brought into the Cold War bipolar world 
order. For many new states this East-West rivalry aided in the shift towards 	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authoritarianism through foreign involvement, and internal conflict as a result of this 
involvement53. 
This represented a shift by authors to not just look at the political situation at that time 
but to view politics within the context of African society and history. With the context 
of the weak institutions and the extent to which the democratic institutions were 
imbedded within society, the lack of homogenisation, the international bipolar world 
order, and the rapid adoption of political participation following independence, the 
African states had to cope with pressure and goal for fast economic development, 
whilst remaining in power. Zolberg argued that in order to balance the increasing 
expectations whilst maintaining support, governments had three options. They could 
meet the expectations, distribution; they could convince the population of their right 
to rule, socialisation and legitimacy; or they could repress the requests of the 
population and suppress any rebels. By 1967 the majority of African states had 
experienced a transition in the leadership, many through violent means. Many new 
states relied on the third option, resulting in the increase of political unrest and the 
collapse of democratic institutions.54 
Historiography on Tanzanian political developments in particular illustrated distinct 
differences between western and African scholars. Tanzania, as will be explained in 
depth throughout this thesis, adopted ‘African socialism’ as ideology in the post-
independence period. Internationally scholars struggled “to understand the theoretical 
implications of Tanzania’s experience for socialism and a more pragmatic concern to 
evaluate the country’s claim to sovereign authority55”. Tanzania’s socialist ideology 
was most definitely, as will be illustrated, an attempt to legitimise ideological, 
economic and political sovereignty. The historiography on Tanzanian democracy and 
its socialist ideology has struggled to place Tanzania’s developments within the 
international debates on modernisation, socialism, dependency theory etc. whilst 
recognising Tanzania’s need for establishing and legitimising itself as a sovereign 
African state. African socialism, and the Tanzanian policy of Ujamaa, gave African 
scholars an opportunity to add to and refute the international dominant intellectual 	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discussions, most importantly the modernisation theory, which influenced both 
imperialism and the global ideas of the post-Second World War world that 
emphasised economic and technological wealth as a precondition for democracy. This 
theory was named the “Dar es Salaam School”. By the 1990s many scholars, both 
western and African, argued that Tanzanian post-colonial policy could be summarised 
by the search of sovereignty and internal and external legitimisation. Thus, the 
modernisation theory, which has dominated African democracy analysis for decades, 
has been revised. This ‘sovereignty theory’ gives historians the opportunity to 
examine the quest for internal and external legitimacy by African states from a 
historical point of view; including both the cultural and political internal implications 
and the historical colonial dependence in the analysis56. 
What is important to keep in mind is the context in which these theories were 
developed, the international context within which post-independence African states 
experienced the political transitions and why there was a shift in thinking. The 1960s 
and 1970s were categorised by the bipolar world order in which the liberal democracy 
versus communist debate was dominant. Arguably, the modernisation debate can 
reflect a need to explain why maintaining dictatorships throughout Africa was more 
favourable than unstable democracies and the possible communist take over; 
democracy was not suited for Africa yet. The 1960s had started as a decade in which 
US foreign policy emphasised supporting countries to achieve political and economic 
development, whilst winning political allies. Decolonisation was changing the 
international political world order, within these changes US foreign policy aimed at 
strengthening US influence as a world power. President Nixon had little support for 
the 1960s emphasis on development, arguing in 1969 that the South was not a priority 
for the US. Africa was only important to the extent that conflict could undermine 
Nixon’s geopolitical goals. Thus, stability rather than democracy was emphasised. 
This differed from Johnson’s presidency, which also saw the instillation and support 
of authoritarian rulers, only in that Nixon showed less difficulty to depart from 
development and democratic goals57.  
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When the ‘actor or strategy perspective’ and ‘sovereignty theory’ became more 
prominent, development aid to African countries had commenced and foreign 
involvement was more frequently backed up by arguments of a moral and ethical 
nature rather than global strategic political arguments. This illustrated a global 
emphasis on human rights, and was further support by President Carter’s foreign 
policy.  
What occurred in Africa in the post-colonial period had been unexpected. The western 
democratic system installed or forced upon by the colonial powers had failed to 
survive in most African states. This led to a discussion as to why they had failed, 
emphasising the universality of African states. The modernisation theory and 
structuralist perspective were dominant in this period. In the decades following they 
moved beyond and looked in more detail at the African states in question, leaders, 
policy and organisation were emphasised as apposed to economic growth and 
structures. The debate then emphasised the search for and the need for legitimisation 
by leaders in the period following independence, the ‘sovereignty theory’. These 
theories will be placed within the Tanzanian context and elaborated to understand 
how Tanzania fit into the historiography of African democracy. 
2.2 Defining Democracy in Africa 
Having had an overview of the historiography of democracy in Africa in the pervious 
section, it is now important to understand democracy as a political system, 
particularly with regard to post-colonial African political structures. As a key aspect 
of this research thesis, democracy and the factors of democracy used as a point of 
departure will be outlined. Furthermore how democracy has been defined and debated 
from a Tanzanian perspective during the post-independence period needs to be 
comprehended in order to get a clear characterisation of Tanzania’s democratic 
development and why this occurred. This definition of democracy will provide an 
additional foundation for analysis of Tanzania’s political system. 
In the immediate post Second World War period the definition of democracy became 
central in the political debate. This debate included a discussion whether an objective 
or more descriptive, subjective definition of democracy was needed. According to 
Samuel Huntington the subjective definition of democracy creates ambivalence and 
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emphasises the “sources of authority for government, purposes served by the 
government, and procedures for constituting government”. In 1942 Joseph 
Schumpeter described what he called the ‘classical theory of democracy’ as 
emphasising both source (the will of the people) and purpose (the common good). 
Schumpeter then put forth ‘another theory of democracy’, arguing that democracy is a 
systematised agreement for making political commitments in which individuals obtain 
the power to do so by competing for the citizen’s vote58. This fuelled a debate 
between those defining democracy subjectively, by source and purpose, and those 
focusing on the system of democracy itself, a ‘procedural definition’. The debate 
ended with the latter being widely accepted by western scholars, this pushed the 
discussion away from defining democracy itself and towards understanding the 
inherent features of democratic systems, how they work and why they fall apart.    
Schumpeter’s ‘procedural definition’ of democracy emphasised competitive elections 
and general participation. Robert Dahl adds to this and outlines these two ‘pillars’ for 
democracy in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. A political system is 
democratic when the policy-makers are determined through competitive elections 
during which effectively the entire adult population is eligible to vote. This insinuates 
the presence of political and civil rights required for contestation such as the right to 
“speak, publish, assemble, and organise”59. Therefore a system is undemocratic if a 
percentage of the population is denied the right vote and no opposition is permitted to 
run for election. Schumpeter and Dahl’s ‘procedural definition’ provides a point of 
departure when assessing whether a political system can be termed democratic. 
 The ‘procedural definition’ of democracy requires further factors to be considered 
when determining whether and to what degree a political system is democratic. 
Firstly, it is difficult to define a state as either democratic or not; there are different 
degrees of democracy. This is part of the discussion as to whether democracy should 
be considered a continuous variable or have distinct divisions, either democratic or 
not. Democracy in post-colonial Africa is in many ways unique, and very much 
dependant on colonial and post-colonial situation, meaning all the determinants of 
democracy in the ‘procedural definition’ can often not be met. Therefore, here 	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democracy will be considered continuous, meaning there are different degrees of 
democratisation and cannot simply be categorised as democratic or not. Another 
important factor is the presence of elections. Defining democracy solely in terms of 
competitive elections is narrow, however. Nonetheless, the idealism used when 
outlining democracy, responsible leaders and policy determined by the population etc, 
create the same issues as the ‘classic theory of democracy’, unclear criteria for 
democracy that make analysis difficult. Therefore, fair, free and open elections are an 
unavoidable characteristic of democracy. A third factor is that after competitive 
elections the political rulers must have solid limitations to their authority. A fourth 
factor involves the stability of democratic structures. This is a continuous variable 
because the degree of stability varies among democratic states. A fifth factor is the 
freedom of the press. Lastly, what categorises non-democratic systems is necessary to 
keep in mind; the two most important aspects of non-democracy are an absence in 
both competitive elections and general voting participation60.  
This ‘procedural definition’ was prevalent in western scholarly thinking in the post-
independence period and has shaped ideas on whether African political systems fit 
into this western democratic model. Nevertheless, the idea of democracy within the 
African context, as defined by both African political leaders and scholars, differs from 
this in several significant ways.   
As was illustrated earlier with the ‘Dar es Salaam School’, for many scholars the 
Tanzanian political situation was in several ways unique. In the 1950s and 1960s 
single-party rule was prevalent throughout Africa and the discussion centred on 
whether multi-party political systems were a requirement for democracy. When using 
the ‘procedural definition’ most would argue that it could not be democratic in most 
cases because the crucial factor of competitive elections was missing in the single-
party system. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s independence leader and president until 
1985, instead argued that whilst party systems are contingent on historical 
circumstances and political cultures, democracy is global and all embracing and can 
be achieved in any political environment, the single-party system included61.  
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Nyerere argued that Africa’s pre-colonial societies were to an extent democratic. For 
Nyerere the three factors essential to democracy are “discussion, equality and 
freedom”62.  According to Nyerere, traditional African societies knew no classes, 
meaning equality, and conducted their business through discussion; “they talk till they 
agree”63. Although this can be debated, the fact that colonialism impeded existing 
societies and political institutions cannot; the colonialists, hampering traditional 
institutions, established autocratic rule64. Pre-Second World War colonial rulers did 
not foresee independence in the near future, and the rapid move towards 
independence in the decades following World War II resulted in the rushed formation 
of representative governments. Despite the rapid transformations, the formation of a 
democratic institution was part of the decolonisation agreement signed with most 
African colonies/states65.  
This argument of inherent cultural democratic legacies became important for the 
Tanzanian justification made for single-party rule in the post-independence period. 
Additionally, the argument of the existence of democratic aspects in the pre-colonial 
period is not new. Often villages had some form of democratic tendencies, such as the 
election of chiefs, and some sort of accountability towards the people. Nevertheless, 
the extent to which these institutions encompassed the factors of democracy 
mentioned earlier was limited. Women were for example excluded from many 
discussions, and accountability towards the population was restricted. Moreover, the 
system of democracy discussed within this research goes beyond the village or tribe 
institutions and focuses on democracy of the nation-state66. That colonial rule 
shattered existing institutions is difficult to refute, however; the French system of 
direct rule, for example, bypassed the system in place whilst the British system of 
indirect rule added additional complexity to the autocratic system by making chiefs 
part of the British colonial system67.     
The African scholarly debate on democracy was not limited to historical aspects of 
democracy, however. Many African leaders, including Nyerere, were educated in 	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Europe and were well acquainted with the western political models. The arguments 
given by leaders and scholars on the definition of democracy came from a different 
stance and differed from the western trends of democratic thinking in various ways. In 
1991, during a period of international and African shifts in political regimes, 
distinguished Tanzanian professor Issa G. Shivji argued that African politicians were 
constantly ‘compradorial’ instead of ‘liberal’ or ‘revolutionary’. According to Shivji, 
liberal views on democracy could only be compradorial, meaning adopted or copied 
from other ideas especially western, because any ideas on political systems had been 
modelled along European thinking. The idea of democracy in Africa became 
connected to the structure of the government as apposed to the fight and will of the 
people. The political systems created in Africa were connected to the ideas of 
imperialism and the state. African leaders and scholars, therefore, hardly diverged 
from the idea of liberalism; hence, ‘compradorialism’. To move away from 
compradorialism a solid stance on the African state and the function of the majority 
within the population was required. The African discussion on democracy needed to 
be based on their historical experiences, and not be limited to a western ‘procedural 
definition’ of democracy68. 
In the 1980s African scholars were involved in a fierce debate in the Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Bulletin and journal 
on the association between development and democracy. These scholars included 
Anyang’ Nyong’o and Thankdika Mkandawire. Nyong’o saw democracy as a 
precondition of development, contrasting with the modernisation debate, and that 
democracy was positively correlated to political stability, the ‘developmentalist’ 
argument. Contrastingly, Mkandawire argued that democracy was ‘good in and of 
itself’ and did not need to be explained in terms of development or other end 
products. Additionally, authoritarian regimes, with examples of the ‘Asian tigers’, had 
achieved better economic progress than democratic regimes. Unlike Nyong’o, 
Mkandawire did not consider African regimes as democratic, with Mauritius and 
Botswana as an exception; instead they permitted some from of political participation 
within the single or multi-party system69. 
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Reflecting on this debate, Shivji argued that liberal democracy in the African context 
was part of ‘the ideology of domination’, referring to the state and ruling class 
ideology in Africa. Democracy defined as ‘popular democracy’ can only be created 
through a social scramble for change. Nonetheless, it needed to be a system and 
ideology that expressed both anti-imperialism and anti-compradorialism70. Both 
Nyong’o and Mkandawire did not do this and simply emphasised the liberal and 
moral model of democracy. Shivji argued that the debate needed to emphasise 
particular issues within African states such as the struggle for civil rights and the issue 
of self-determination. Although anti-imperialism has been and still is a central 
element of many African political systems, anti-compradorialism was virtually 
impossible in the post-independence systems. Even Nyerere, who adopted a unique 
mixture of African ideals and socialism, based his political system on the modern 
existing state system.  
Therefore, although a procedural definition of democracy is important to understand 
and will be used as a basis to examine whether the characteristics of democracy 
mentioned are present in the Tanzanian context and how these characteristics were 
altered over time, it is important to keep in mind that there are different degrees of 
democracy and different points of departure with regard to what democracy 
constitutes. The ‘sovereignty theory’ and African debate on the democracy, including 
the ‘ideology of domination’, illustrates that democracy in African states came about 
in a completely different manner than was the case in Europe. Although there was the 
struggle for independence, this struggle did not encompass a similar struggle for 
democratic freedoms. Democracy in Africa cannot simply be placed within the 
procedural definition of democracy. 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way further illustrate this with their argument that a 
level political field is crucial for democracy. Within the African context unfair 
competition needs to be considered as an important characteristic of existing 
democratic systems. Although free elections and civil rights may exist, many African 
ruling parties often have unfair advantages, including access to resources and media; 
the opposition party has often already lost the elections before the political campaign 
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has started71. Therefore, referring to the ‘level-playing field’ can assess levels of 
democracy within the African context further, even when both Schumpeter and 
Dahl’s democratic characteristics are met. Their model of assessing democracy, 
although crucial, cannot necessarily fit the African context, as will be illustrated 
throughout this thesis and is contradicted, especially in the last decade or two, by 
many scholars. Therefore, this thesis will keep the ‘procedural definition’ in mind, as 
well as the ‘sovereignty theory’ and ‘ideology of dominance’ theory when assessing 
whether the Tanzanian democracy can be categorised within Sklar’s definition of 
‘socialist democracy’ and ‘guided democracy’, and how Tanzania’s democratic 
development was shaped by the political national identity. 
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3. Defining Tanzania’s Political National Identity 
Tanzania’s political national identity has proven a fundamental tool in the 
development of Tanzania’s democracy. To grasp how and why this occurred and 
whether this has assisted or hindered the eventual development of a multi-party 
system, the political national identity and what it entails will be outlined. Not only is 
this an illustration of its use as a political tool, but this will also encapsulate the basic 
aspects of Tanzanian nationalism.  
The essence of nationalism throughout Africa was anti-imperialism. Nationalism 
became a declaration of the resistance against colonial rule; this categorisation of 
nationalism as a declaration of struggle was sustained after independence. Self-
determination remained, therefore, paramount in the African nationalist discourse. 
The objective of the nationalist movement was independence, but other underlying 
goals were the entitlement to self-determination and decision-making. Following the 
achievement of independence this referred to the sovereignty of the state. This was 
not self-evident; independence and sovereignty were separate entities. The nationalist 
independence movements, therefore, quickly moved from nation building to state 
building exercises72. 
In Tanzania, following independence and the creation of a single-party state in 1965 
the Tanzanian independence party, TANU, became a distinct part of the state instead 
of a separate organisation and part of the civil society; a ‘state party’. TANU became 
not only a ruling party attempting to stay in government but a “supreme political 
existence which holds the last word on social good and the political truth”73. The 
traditional focus of a political party, to obtain a position in government and dominate 
political influence, was transformed into a single focus for TANU, to dominate 
politics. No political activity was allowed outside of the ‘state party’. Several media 
channels, institutions and schools became state controlled, and only limited individual 
non-dangerous voicing of differences was tolerated. State decisions were made behind 
closed doors and were not transparent. Most importantly, dominating politically 
meant dominating ideologically, referring to a congruency of ideas. The strongest 	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argument given for the creation of one-party state system has been the need for 
national unity, and because TANU dominated ideologically it was essential in the 
push for a national identity. 
National unity needs to be defined in order to grasp how the one-party state played a 
role in its creation. Tanzania had no real threat of external hostility and the party had 
not eradicated all the people’s different views and ideas, therefore, national unity 
refers to the party’s effective containment of the possibility for orchestrated voicing 
of different interests within society74. The party and government therefore constructed 
national unity as a political tool to prevent serious opposition from being voiced. 
Part of nationalist anti-imperialism and the call for the entitlement to self-
determination and decision-making was the eradication of oppression. TANU used 
and rephrased popular discontent to create a nationalist discourse. The nationalist 
vocabulary that had been created in Dar es Salaam during the independence 
movement was used to TANU’s advantage. The government adopted the vocabulary 
referring to the eradication of exploitation and oppression to build the foundations for 
the creation of a national identity; Tanzania’s citizens were required to devote 
themselves to ending oppression and exploitation. This was useful because it 
legitimised the single-party government by highlighting its associations with the 
independence movement. Tapping into widespread dissatisfaction gave TANU 
internal legitimacy. 
Working together to build a nation became widespread rhetoric. This formed part of 
the government’s post-independence Ujamaa ideology. Other aspects of this identity 
include the traditional African family; Ujamaa loosely translates as ‘family-hood’. 
Ujamaa dismissed European capitalist policies for development and demanded the 
traditional African society be brought to the forefront. Nyerere argued this society had 
very little space for oppression and exploitation. The people would work together, 
with little economic disparity, to fight poverty. This was a rhetoric that anyone within 
the country, both the relatively better educated urban population and the majority 
uneducated rural farmer population, could easily understand and relate to. Through 
these ideas TANU was able to establish itself as Tanzania’s sole legitimate 	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authority75. It was also able to create a feeling of nationhood for the population, based 
on Nyerere’s Africanised version of socialism that appealed and related to the 
majority of the population76.  
Hence, this political national identity was installed within the population through the 
one-party political system as well as the nation-wide extensive Ujamaa policies. The 
ideology has become so ingrained in society because it emphasised tradition and 
history as its foundations. African traditions were used to create popular support for 
political modernising policies; democracy was presented as intrinsically African, and 
socialism was made to fit the African agricultural culture and named African 
socialism77. 
The ruling party that emerged from TANU, CCM, is a fundamental part of this 
political national identity. Having been the ruling party for decades, CCM as a ‘state 
party’ was ingrained in people’s minds as being one and the same as the government. 
During the discussions for the transition to multi-party politics a commission was set 
up in 1992 to analyse what political system was best suited in Tanzania. This was a 
specifically selected commission with Chief Justice F. L. Nyalali as the Chair. The 
commission spoke to over 36,000 people throughout the country, supposedly allowed 
to convey their views without restrictions, and discovered that 77% of participants 
preferred the continuation of the one-party system. This illustrates the ingrained 
support for the one-party system and CCM throughout the country78. This and the 
Ujamaa ideology are crucial for understanding the development of democracy in 
Tanzania, particularly because after more than twenty years of multi-party politics 
this image of CCM as ‘state party’ is arguably still ingrained in the political national 
identity.  
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4. Tanzania’s Independence Movement 
This chapter will look into Tanzania’s independence movement from the mid 1950s 
until independence in December 1961, and the foundations laid for a political national 
identity to analyse how this identity shaped Tanzanian’s democratic development and 
why this occurred. The independence party and later governing party, TANU, played 
an important role in the independence movement and was crucial in shaping the post-
colonial political system. TANU went from a “semi-protest movement to a party of 
national integration and consolidation”79. Understanding its policies and their 
consequences is crucial for understanding the Tanzania political system and political 
national identity today because it laid its foundations. African independence 
movements were born to oppose colonialist rule, not as a movement with a strong 
ideological focus. This meant that these parties had a resistant and defensive focus 
from their establishment as decolonisation movements and were suddenly required to 
make governing decisions following independence. They were thus required to 
change rapidly, and during this transformation both internal and external forces 
influenced the process80. This change also reflected the need to immediately 
legitimise themselves internally as the new ruling entity in order to prevent and 
maintain in power and prevent conflict. The foundations laid for a political national 
identity during the independence movement, although not well defined in terms of 
ideology or policy, became an important part of TANU’s post-colonial ideology; it 
reflected statements, and ideas emphasised during the independence movement to 
mobilise the population against colonialism. There was considerable pressure on 
TANU to become the uncontested authority in the new country whilst fulfilling the 
objective of establishing a solid idea of nationhood among the population81. 
Nationhood and uncontested authority when hand in hand, it was used to legitimise 
the single-party state. 
After the end of World War II the British declared their decision to transfer their 
mandated territory of Tanzania under the newly established International Trusteeship 
System of the United Nations (UN). During this declaration Ernest Bevin, at that time 	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the Secretary State of Foreign Affairs, stated “the people of the territories themselves 
and the world at large should be left in no doubt that the continuity of British 
administration will be maintained until the ultimate objective of the trusteeship 
system, self-government or independence, as the case may be, is attained”82. This was 
a move to prepare Tanzania for independence. Under the Trusteeship, however, the 
British had asked for and received the ability to assign to Tanzania any type of Union 
that they deemed most suited.  
Tanzania prospered during the World War II years; minerals discovered allowed for 
economic growth and Tanzania provided military personnel to the war effort. This did 
not lead to nationalist political groups and independence movements as it had in 
neighbouring countries, however. Tanzania’s nationalist movement did not appear for 
another decade83. This illustrates that Tanzania was not yet prepared for a nationalist 
movement and required the right circumstances for its commencement. 
4.1 TANU: the creation of the independence party 
TANU was formed in July 1954 during an Annual Conference of the Tanganyika 
African Association (TAA). TAA was created in the late 1920s as an organisation for 
urban Tanzanians. The British Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, referred to TAA as a 
more social rather than political organisation, with most members being government 
personnel, teachers and business owners. After World War II TAA became more 
politically active and looked towards the rural areas for support; it slowly evolved into 
a national political group, albeit limited in size84. In 1951 it was reported that the 
association had approximately 5,000 members, mostly in the urban areas; its support 
in the rural areas was minimal, and not enough to constitute an influential political 
movement. By 1953, however, TAA was virtually inactive when Julius Nyerere was 
elected president of the association. It was Nyerere who recognised that the TAA was 
not political enough and moved in a political direction by forming TANU in 1954. 
According to Clagett J. Taylor TANU had over one million registered members by 
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195485; this is very different from 150,000-200,000 in 1957 figure provided by 
Gabriel Ruhubika86. 
As outlined in its constitution, TANU’s objectives were to get Tanzania ready for 
independence and self-governance, and to push for Tanzania’s independence; ‘Uhuru’ 
in Swahili. Additional objectives were to unify Tanzania by ending tribalism, and to 
end racial and economic segregation. TANU presented itself as the country’s 
nationalist independence party. It did not, however, emphasise an ideology within its 
constitution; according to Ruhubika the party was open “to all Africans in 
Tanganyika”87. This highlights that TANU’s plan was foremost to represent itself as a 
nationalist movement and to unify the country rather than commit to an ideology and 
perhaps become presented as predominantly a political movement. The fact that 
TANU did not emphasise an ideology, meant that following independence the 
countries political path still needed to be determined. As will be illustrated, the 
foundations for an ideology were laid during the nationalist movement, however.  
Within a few years TANU had established itself as the nationalist movement in 
Tanzania. There are several reasons for its success. These include its use of TAA, 
successful leadership, the promotion of Swahili as a national language and its 
effective collaboration with other organisations within Tanzania. The fact that TANU 
originated from the existing TAA organisation provided it with several fundamental 
foundations. In its decades of existence, TAA had despite its small size a well-
established territorial support base.  The TAA representatives in the regions 
immediately advocated TANU; highlighting TANU from its start as a nationalist 
party representing all Tanzanian’s countrywide. Additionally, TANU used TAA’s 
offices. Therefore, TAA provided TANU’s initial support and infrastructural 
foundations. Successful leadership was also transferred from TAA to TANU. 
TANU’s leaders were inherited from TAA and unified under Nyerere’s leadership.88 
Unlike many of its neighbouring countries, TANU did not start with a support base 
from one particularly ethnic tribe or group, but had a national support base thanks to 
TAA. Furthermore, its leaders were former TAA leaders and their sole motive was 	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unity against colonialism. This was an important steppingstone for the creation of a 
nationalist party that did not emphasise ethnicity of tribes; from its founding TANU 
emphasised national rather than regional issues and refused to allow factors of 
division to reign supreme. 
Swahili was an important tool in TANU’s growth. By only using Swahili as the party 
language, TANU was presented as a nationalist and unifying party. Swahili was the 
language understood by most Tanzanians and was, therefore, used during party 
gatherings. This allowed a majority of Tanzanians to understand party leaders and 
view them as national leaders rather than of an ethic group. TANU’s collaboration 
with other organisations, whose views were complementary to theirs, was another 
reason for its success. As TANU got more powerful it was able to gain control over 
many of these organisations. 
Lastly, TANU’s growth was aided by external factors that contributed to its leaders’ 
confidence. Firstly, the United Nations was understanding and supportive to TANU. 
This gave them a feeling of strong international support in their struggle. Secondly, as 
other African countries completed the decolonisation process, Nyerere and other 
leaders had an example of what the result could be; Ghana and its leader Nkrumah 
were particularly motivating for TANU89. 
In 1966 Nyerere identified several issues TANU faced in its first years. Firstly, the 
religious divide between Christians and Muslims could have pushed TANU into a 
situation of religious conflict; this was avoided by the flexibility of religious leaders, 
particularly on the predominantly Muslim coast. Secondly, corruption was an issue 
and it was not always easy to ensure TANU’s officials continuously followed the 
party’s moral values. Thirdly, TANU struggled financially because the bulk of its 
members were unable to pay its membership fees. Fourthly, Nyerere argued that the 
biggest problem TANU faced was preventing it from becoming a racially focused 
organisation. Until 1963 membership was limited racially90. This became a sensitive 
issue following independence, and plausibly led to Nyerere’s resignation as Prime 
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Minister one month after independence in January 1962 to focus on TANU and rural 
support base91.  
TANU had nevertheless successfully established itself as the country’s nationalist and 
independence movement. This movement was non-violent movement. Furthermore, 
Nyerere repeatedly emphasised the importance of being prepared for independence 
and urged for a steady, slow transition towards this. The manner in which TANU 
approached independence and urged for unity and non-violence was an important 
characteristic of the independence movement. This stemmed from strong TANU 
leadership; hence, leadership was an important factor of the development of the 
Tanzanian post-independence democratic structure. 
TANU faced opposition from various sides, including the colonial government, 
organisations, and individuals. The way in which this opposition affected TANU 
illustrates the extent to which TANU had already mobilised and dominated that 
nationalist movement92. The colonial government opposed TANU after its 
establishment from TAA by creating bureaucratic difficulties. TANU was required to 
register its branch offices, and TANU members and leaders were threatened with 
imprisonment. By 1955 many of the TANU branches had been banned by the 
government. This did not, however, deter its spread throughout the country, illustrated 
by the thousands of members TANU had gathered by the time the party was once 
again permitted in 195993. Additionally, TANU faced political opposition for the first 
time in February 1956 following the creation of the United Tanganyika Party (UTP). 
UTP was formed by unofficial members of the legislative council, 28 members from 
the council joined UTP. UTP distinguished themselves from TANU as a multi-racial 
party open to all. TANU immediately criticised UTP as a Eurocentric party 
supporting European and Asian electoral domination, to which UTP replied that 
unlike TANU they did not only emphasise African nationalism but countrywide 
nationalism, no matter the race94.  
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The UTP, however, soon started to struggle to attract followers and became more of a 
channel for discussion than a political body. In 1957 it had 11,000 members, with 
76% being African. The reasons given for its failure to gain a mass following 
included that it emphasised multi-racialism in a country in which the European elite 
was perceived as having exploited the majority. Furthermore, there was no common 
ground for the poorer African masses and the elite groups to stand on. As Ruhubika 
argues, opposition to TANU often resulted out of ignorance as well as from a group 
of individuals with a sincere fear of losing their positions of power within the colonial 
government95. This lack of serious political opposition not only provided stability but 
also gave TANU more room to push its own political agenda and ideas after 
independence. 
4.2 The creation of an independence nationalist ideology 
As the country’s nationalist movement, TANU outlined several concepts throughout 
the independence movement that it saw as crucial. Even without an ideology until 
after independence, these concepts arguably laid the foundations for an ideology that 
would form the political national identity. As mentioned in Chapter 4, anti-imperial 
sentiments defined the nationalist movement. Therefore, anti-imperialism and a need 
to rid itself of oppression were already established as an important aspect of the 
national identity during the independence movement. In addition, Nyerere vigorously 
reduced the importance of ethnicity and voiced the need for a national identity. 
Nyerere was motivated by socialist ideas and repeatedly mentioned his goal of Pan-
Africanism96. As he wrote in a paper for the second Conference of Independent 
African States in June 1960, “in the struggle against Colonialism the fundamental 
unity of the people of Africa is evident and is deeply felt”97.  
Despite this, up until 1958 Nyerere did not see the need to seriously think about an 
ideology or policy for the independence movement other than achieving self-
governance98. Additionally, Colin Leys argued in 1962 that prior to its independence 
very little research had been done into Tanzania’s national features, and that despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika,169-170. 
96 Edward Miguel, “Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania,” 
World Politics 56(3) (2004), 337. 
97 Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 85. 
98 Glickman, “Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context,” 198. 
Julia Müller 
Tanzania’s Political National Identity and Democratic Development 
 
39 
 
the nationally spoken language of Swahili, Tanzania was a fairly badly unified 
country99. Contrastingly, Ian C. Parker argued in 1972 that the importance in the use 
of ideology in government policies later depends on the degree to which it uses an 
already present national identity. Securing ideological control, therefore, requires a 
level of national unity, and common traditions and interests. Parker mentions that 
Tanzania is fortunate for the level of national consciousness, and argues that this is 
because no one group within Tanzania has been able to serious exploit or oppress 
another, contrasting to, for example, Kenya and Uganda. This is due to several factors 
including: (1) low population density and a large area of land; (2) no one dominant 
tribe in the country; (3) Swahili as a means for state-wide communication; (4) severe 
poverty throughout the country meaning approximate equality; (5) Tanzanian was 
never a colony or protectorate like Kenya or Uganda but a trusteeship territory under 
the League of Nations and later the UN meaning that after 1945 the UK had to adhere 
to restrictions; and (6) TANU superiority preceded independence100. Although Leys 
was right in that Tanzania was not necessarily a unified country at independence, an 
amalgamation of historical and structural factors has meant that nationalist ideology 
could play a very influential role within society and policy making.   
These historical factors were used by TANU during the independence period to create 
a national identity. In Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania Claude Ake 
mentions that to understand ideology, in this case the nationalist ideology, it is 
necessary to emphasise the ‘objective conditions’ that construct it. Objective 
conditions lay the foundations for ideology and establish what needs to change and 
the required action. Tanzania’s colonial history, oppression, severe poverty and lack 
of self-dependence are the objective conditions that created its nationalist ideology. 
The nationalist movement, and therefore, the foundations for a political national 
identity were based on entrenched anti-colonial sentiments.  
Nationalist movements throughout the continent were led, however, by a small group 
of people who were assimilated into the coloniser’s culture often by having been 
educated abroad, and thus understood both the interests of the coloniser and those of 
the majority. This elite group needed to mobilise the majority, however, as the 	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majority justified their power struggle. TANU formulated its struggle in order to 
achieve this mass mobilisation and the politicisation of the nationalist ideologies101. 
This was not as easy as expected, especially in comparison to neighbouring countries. 
John Iliffe has argued that upon Nyerere’s return to Tanzania from his studies in the 
UK in 1952 the population was not ready for large-scale political mobilisation. This 
was mainly because, although under colonial rule and experiencing oppression, a 
large part of the population had somewhat small complaints with land issues due to 
the relatively small number of settlers. As already mentioned, the lack of one stronger 
tribe meant that little political mobilisation had occurred in specific regions and 
districts, and that there was no history of elite political movements.  
A nationalist movement, therefore, needed to emphasise Tanzania’s future by 
illustrating other transitions to independence, namely India and Ghana. Importantly, 
Nyerere’s own views played a role in the establishment of this nationalist ideology. 
Nyerere was “racially sensitive, hated foreign rule, feared Conservative complicity 
with settler ambitions, and knew that Africa was moving towards conflict and 
liberation”102. Thus, in order to achieve mass support for a movement that would back 
political modernisation with the establishment of a democratic state, and impede 
internal conflict whilst remaining inherently African, Nyerere described this future 
system within traditional African structures. Nyerere pictured this system, although 
within traditional African structures, as democratic because of his own belief in 
democracy as well as the specific requirements put forth by the British103. Nyerere 
and TANU illustrated the traditional African society and its family structure as equal 
and self-reliant, which developed through hard work and the sharing of its profits. 
This was a description that could be understood by all Tanzanians throughout the 
country and related to by all Tanzanians; “African family life was everywhere based 
on certain practices and attitudes which together meant basic equality, freedom and 
unity” 104. These terms became the rhetoric of the independence movement. By 1960 
TANU was a national movement with ideas that were supported by almost every 
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Tanzanian, and difficult to refute along traditional African thinking105. This 
movement formed the basis of the post-colonial political national identity. 
4.3 The Road to Independence  
Tanzania’s struggle for independence differs from that of other African states in that 
virtually no violence was used. This not only shaped the road to independence but 
also shaped TANU and the political system that would follow independence. The 
increased verbalisation of their unhappiness with the colonial system by the African 
elite in the post-Second World War period was faced with little objection from British 
rule. Britain was economically scarred by the Second World War and understood that 
it could no longer support its colonies economically as well as ethically in the long 
term. Eventual independence was accepted and this is illustrated by the shift of its 
colony to a trusteeship. This turned the anti-colonial fight into a discussion between 
the nationalist movement and Britain on the timing of independence and type of 
political system that should remain. This non-violent transition affected TANU’s 
ideological formation because rather than militarily opposing the colonialists they 
tried to meet their needs for independence rapidly. Most importantly, this included a 
large support base within the population. The population was needed to support the 
nationalist ideas and although TANU already had a support base, it was necessary for 
the population, particularly rural, to understand the benefits of independence. This 
was difficult due to the disparity of the population, particularly in the rural areas, and 
the low level of education. The most effective way of doing this was to emphasise the 
economic benefits and growth that would come with independence and self-
governance. TANU therefore adopted economic development and equality as its main 
points, although how this would be done through policy was not fully established or 
discussed until after independence. The promises made during the independence 
movement, without a clear idea of how to fulfil them later created difficulties for the 
TANU government in the immediate post-independence period. 
Colonial Tanzania had a relatively small population of settlers; this group included 
European and Asian settlers. Nevertheless, the majority population of Africans 
consisted of 120 different tribes, with different languages and religions. Religious 	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groups included protestant and catholic Christians, Muslims and traditional religions; 
in 1957 these made up 7.8 and 17.1, 30.9 and 44.2 percent of the population 
respectively106. Therefore, distinct cultural differences existed. To persons within the 
UN Trusteeship council these tribal issues were the biggest impediment to a 
nationalist independence movement. Importantly, unlike neighbouring Uganda and 
Kenya, Tanzania did not have any substantial and dominating tribes. In 1957 the 
largest tribe, the Sukuma, constituted only 12% of the population. Moreover, the 
Sukuma never became the emphasis of the independence movement, unlike the 
Kikuyu and Luo in Kenya and the Baganda in Uganda. In addition, the colonial 
system and pre-colonial slave trade may have weakened the tribal system in Tanzania. 
The Arab slave trade route from eastern Congo to the Tanzanian coast had exposed 
the Tanzanian population to the Arab cultures and religion. 
Another factor of pre-colonial and colonial rule was the spread of Swahili as a 
national language, as already mentioned this later helped with the creation of a 
nationalist independence movement. During the slave trade the Arab traders spread 
Swahili from the coast inland up to the Congo. Both the Germans and British 
colonialists used Swahili as their language for administration. In addition to language, 
the German colonial rule, although criticised for having disrupted Tanzania, may have 
aided unity. Nyerere argued that the Maji-Maji revolt of 1905, during which southern 
tribes united to revolt against German rule, established Tanzanian nationalism by 
uniting tribes for the first time107. Nyerere further encouraged non-tribalism; this 
became an important reason for the Tanzanian political culture existing today. 
Stability was an important factor for the development of democracy in Tanzania. The 
lack of ethnic division created political stability and increased national unity making 
it easier for post-independence policies to be accepted and implemented nation-wide. 
Unlike its neighbouring countries, where ethnic divisions often fuelled debate and 
conflict, Tanzania’s national unity was not seriously questioned after independence; 
Nyerere’s frequent call for the need of certain policies for the good of the nation as a 
whole were met with little protest from ethnic or religious factions. This was amongst 
others a result of TANU’s nationalist movement and post-independence policies and 
further legitimised TANU and later CCM’s rule.  	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In 1954 a UN visiting mission to Tanzania published a report on the trusteeship and 
progress. The mission’s report was criticised by the Government in Tanzania as well 
as the European and Asian communities. A newspaper article in the Tanganyika 
Standard in 1955 named “UN Mission Proposes Timetable for Tanganyika” stated: 
“In a lengthy report published today, the United Nations Visiting Mission which 
toured Tanganyika for five weeks last year outlines its impressions and puts 
forward several drastic recommendations, particularly relating to political 
development. 
The mission looks forward to a Legislative Council with a majority of Africans 
on the unofficial benches at the end of three years from the commencement of 
the “parity” period, and self-government within 20 or 25 years.  
The chairman of the mission, Mr. J. S. Reid, from New Zealand, disagrees with 
the majority view that constitutional progress should be speeded up and 
approves, in general, the present cautious approach of the government”. 
This newspaper also had an article titled “UN Timetables Unacceptable to UK 
Government” and “Sir Eldred Hitchcock Condemns Report and Calls for Rejection”. 
The 1954 report was supported by some and rejected by others. The Mission reported 
that “no stability is possible unless it is made clear that the goal is the government of 
the country mainly by Africans” and it reported that “among a number of the better-
educated African who are in a position to influence public opinion there is a desire for 
a more definite sense of direction than they now have regarding the future 
development of the territory”108. Comparing their analysis that Ruanda-Urundi would 
be ready for independence in 20 to 25 years they argued that, 
“Applying the same criteria and bearing in mind the striking development in 
Tanganyika during the last eight years, and despite its unevenness, the much 
larger area of the Territory, and its widely dispersed population, the mission 
believes that self-government is within reach of the people of Tanganyika much 
earlier. It must be borne in mind that other factors may well intervene, internally 
or from the outside, which will speed up the progress towards self-government. 
The point is that, even at the present pace of development, the people can be 
developed to become self-governing within a single generation”.  	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The mission, therefore, felt that independence would be possible anywhere between 
1975 and 1985. The structure of the Legislative Council was also under discussion, 
with many questioning the racial representation rules. The report recommended the 
electing the legislative council members at the local and central level to practice the 
electoral process. Additionally, with the growing strength of African organisations the 
need for an African majority was brought up. Furthermore, the mission considered 
TANU as Tanzania’s national and independence movement. The mission’s chairman, 
J.S. Reid, distanced himself from several statements and didn’t feel that Tanzania was 
ready to elect the Legislative Council members yet. Further opposition to the report 
came from the European citizens, arguing that many of the statements were 
unfounded because most African citizens supported the current Government’s 
policies. The Legislative Council was begrudged that they had not been allowed to 
provide comments to the report before it was published in New York and that the 
Trusteeship Council had accepted the report. Moreover, the British Government 
rejected the report arguing that the visiting mission’s report was not realistic with 
regard to political and economic development statements and that it had given more 
emphasis to TANU than other authorities. Contrastingly, TANU recognised that the 
report supported its position beyond what it had hoped, and Nyerere was immediately 
flown to the UN to highlight TANU’s support of the mission109.  
The 1954 UN trusteeship examination report further argued that Tanzania could be 
seen as a non-racial country because it had no racial issues and that intended dates for 
of political, economic, and social development could be set. This was met with a large 
amount of criticism from the press in Tanzania, which was still colonial, and 
displeasure on the part of the British representative to the UN council. Nyerere, 
although pleased with the ideas, stated that Tanzania was not prepared for 
independence and self-rule immediately and “urged Africans to join with TANU in 
laying the foundations of possible self-governance in 20 to 25 years’ time”110. This 
illustrates a long-term focuses as well as a non-violent independence movement. 
Nyerere recognised the need for capacity before complete independence; this had not 
been achieved. The accelerated move towards independence several years later was 
crucial in Tanzania’s development of democracy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika, 124-134.  
110 Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika, 139. 
Julia Müller 
Tanzania’s Political National Identity and Democratic Development 
 
45 
 
The UN mission’s visit and report was a political success for TANU. Tanzania’s 
nationalist movement received international recognition through the report. 
Furthermore, domestically the report and Nyerere’s visit to New York had even more 
of an impact. In January 1955 people were hesitant to join TANU for the fear that the 
party could be banned. Contrastingly, on March 20 1955 when Nyerere described the 
report’s conclusions in front of a crowd in Dar es Salaam, the crowd expressed anger 
at the statement that independence would be a reality in 20 to 25 years. TANU 
membership in Dar es Salaam was reporting hundreds of new members a day by June 
1955; in January 1955 this number had been 2,000. TANU and its independent 
movement spread rapidly and received widespread internal legitimacy as the 
nationalist movement111.  
During the opening of the Legislative Council’s new assembly in April 1956 
Governor Sir Edward Twining indicated that the government intended to start 
elections in some constituencies in 1958. These elections were important as TANU 
needed to illustrate widespread support by the voting African population112. 
Nevertheless in 1957 the government moved against TANU and banned them from 
having public meetings following TANU’s increased influence and indirectly because 
of a statement made by a TANU member in Korogwe that from then on TANU 
governed Tanzania; party members were not prevented from meeting, however. 
Nyerere illustrated that even with the banning, TANU’s membership continued to 
increase; by June 1957 membership was between 150,000 and 200,000. The 
government ended the ban on TANU following criticism from the Trusteeship 
Council. The council urged the UK to allow for freedom of speech, considering the 
elections that were to take place in 1958. In 1957 Governor Twining took an 
additional step towards preparing Tanzania for self-governance and nominated six 
assistant ministers from the unofficial section of the legislative council; four Africans, 
one European and one Asian were chosen. By 1958 Nyerere was nominated by the 
Governor to take part in the Legislative Council113. 
Steps towards independence speeded up following the arrival of the new Governor, 
Sir Richard Turnbull in July 1958. Sir Turnbull immediately called for further 	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elections for the Legislative Council to take place earlier, in 1959, and stated that he 
recognised that the post-independence government will be predominantly African. In 
March 1959 fifteen newly elected members joined the council. Turnbull immediately 
announced that because of the rapid move towards self-government, five members of 
the elected opposition would be selected to join the ministerial office. Nyerere 
rejected his nomination, as leader of the opposition he felt it more necessary to 
continue rallying support. Another possible reason for why Nyerere chose not to 
participate was so that he and his movement would not be associated with the colonial 
government by the public.  
The government was rapidly moving towards self-governance, with the next elections 
being moved from 1962 to 1960. The British government stated that a Tanzanian 
‘responsible government’ was to be formed in 1960, this was stated only five years 
after rejected the UN mission’s statement for self-governance in twenty to twenty-five 
years. Nyerere, however, repeatedly mentioned in speeches that ‘responsible 
government’ differed from independence and that independence was unthinkable 
immediately because of the need for economic development114. Arguably Nyerere 
emphasised this to ensure that TANU and the population was ready for self-
government and that national unity was well established; conflict could be avoided if 
national unity was secured.  
Following the elections the new Legislative Council met in October 1960, 
commencing ‘responsible government’; TANU won 12 out of the 13 seats contested. 
The Council included 52 Africans, 16 Europeans and 11 Asians. By January 1961 the 
British Government announced that Tanzanian independence would be granted in 
December 1961. In May 1961 Tanzania was granted internal self-government with 
Nyerere as Prime Minister. On 9 December 1961 Tanzania was granted full 
independence115. This sudden rapid move towards independence is an important 
external factor that influenced Tanzania’s development of democracy. There was a 
lack of capacity to immediately take over governing the country. TANU was therefore 
faced with challenges including ensuring legitimisation and being able to meet the 
population’s expectations. 	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The decolonisation process speeded up in the late 1950s following a drastic change in 
British policy. Several historians, including D.A. Low have argued that nationalist 
movements were important in putting pressure on the British government. In the 
1950s the conservative government feared that conflict movements, such as the ones 
present in the Belgian Congo and French Algeria, could spread into its East African 
colonies; in the mid-1950s the Kenyan independence movement was becoming 
increasingly violent with the start of the Mau Mau revolt. Furthermore, it was 
believed that the nationalist movements were weakening British control in Tanzania 
and rapid independence could encourage collaboration between the independence 
government and the UK. These issues led to conservative Leader Harold MacMillan’s 
famous ‘Winds of Change’ Speech in South Africa in 1960, “The wind of change is 
blowing through this continent and whether we like it or not, this growth of national 
consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national 
policies must take account of it”116. Economic exhaustion as a result of Second World 
War, and the start of a violent struggle in Kenya, led to the acceleration of the 
decolonisation of Tanzania, as Tanzania was of less importance for British interests. 
Additionally, pressure from the US to grant countries independence eventually meant 
that it was no longer morally feasible. 
The foundations for a political national identity including economic development, 
equality, and unity had been laid during the independence movement. Following 
independence, government policies further used these to encourage the creation of a 
national identity and consciousness117. These foundations, or nationalist ideology, 
were used in the creation and implementation of a party ideology and government 
policies. Although this ideology had not been established, and rather “functioned 
dynamically as an organic and evolving image of national direction and priorities in 
the social and economic spheres,”118 its foundations of self-reliance, equality and 
economic development remained.  
Therefore, in addition to several Tanzanian factors concerning heritage that   
prevented ethnic conflict to an extent, TANU grew as the independence party by 	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emphasising a nationalist ideology based on self-reliance, equality and economic 
development. This ideology was understood and related to by the majority and 
highlighted several existing unifying factors. Amongst others due to a lack of 
effective opposition, TANU quickly received internal recognition as the independence 
movement. Additionally, UN recognition gave TANU’s nationalist movement 
international recognition. The nationalist identity created in this period shaped 
Tanzania’s post-independence political system. It did this by including the deep-
rooted pre-independence ideas and beliefs, adding to its successful implementation, 
and giving TANU internal recognition. This became fundamental in the post-
independence struggle for legitimacy, and influenced how the nationalist identity was 
used as a political tool. 
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5. Tanzania’s Post-Independence Struggle for Legitimacy 
Tanzania’s post-independence political structure has become intertwined with a deep-
rooted political national identity created in the post-independence period and based on 
the independence nationalist identity. This structure combined the one-party state 
system with its ideology of Ujamaa, emphasising self-reliance and African socialism, 
resulting in a mixture of centralised, decentralised, and modern and anti-modern 
features119. In this chapter Tanzania’s post-independence political system and its 
relationship with the establishment of a political national identity will be analysed. 
During this period the Tanzanian government implemented perhaps the most 
determined nation-building programme in region120, which has had long lasting 
implications for Tanzania’s democratic development. How and why this has shaped 
Tanzania’s democratic development will be outlined. 
5.1 The struggle for legitimisation and the creation of a republic 
In the immediate post-colonial period nationalist movements were suddenly faced 
with the issue of legitimisation. In order to function, states crucially needed to obtain 
internal and external legitimacy; what has been termed the ‘sovereignty theory’121. 
Nationalist movements, now being the government, had to cope with the ‘tutelary’ 
systems that presumed the existence of a modern liberal state, and needed to enforce 
national ideas and policies on ethnically, religiously, racially and regionally tribal-
based systems each with their own ideas and organisations. This sums up the state-
building and nation-building difficulty independent African states experienced122. The 
sovereignty theory is significant when analysing the political systems that emerged in 
newly independent African countries, including Tanzania, because nations needed to 
be constructed within imperially demarcated borders. Independence governments felt 
threatened and vulnerable; they needed to legitimise their rule rapidly in order to 
remain in power. TANU was able to deal with these difficulties by using the 
foundations of its already established nationalist identity and pushing it further. 
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The relationship between the government and population altered drastically in the 
post-independence period, which occurred within a short period of time. Suddenly, 
TANU was required to govern within the newly created political system. They were 
no longer the opposition, critical of the colonial government and rallying popular 
support. This meant that there was a new need for an ideological focus; TANU was 
required to shift away from its emphasis on national unity and figure out its political 
philosophy. During the independence movement and early post-independence period 
Nyerere often outlined Tanzania’s political system as having two main objectives. 
These were economic development, and the achievement of social and economic 
equality123.  
In the period immediately before independence when TANU already held an 
extensive majority within the Legislative Council, criticism against Nyerere and 
TANU increased, which needs to be analysed in context. TANU went from an 
independence movement to a policy-making ruling party in a very short timeframe. 
Concrete policies needed to reflect the arguments for the future of Tanzania that were 
made by TANU during the independence struggle, and this proved a difficult 
challenge124. Colin Leys argues that the political establishment in the independence 
period had been easier than was good for TANU. TANU was somewhat less 
organised and deep-rooted than its sudden growth and success indicate as is illustrated 
by the difficulties faced in the immediate post-independence period125. All newly 
independent African countries were faced with difficulties and political threats, 
however. Leys’ argument reflects the relatively weak opposition TANU faced. 
Nevertheless, TANU’s creation of nationalist sentiments was the reason for its 
successful rallying of support; TANU was relatively well established because of this. 
Arguably, TANU struggled in the post-independence period because how to fulfil the 
independence promises was not known. Independence expectations needed to be 
contained and made realistic, and a political internal struggle threatened TANU in the 
first years of independence. 
The exchange of power from colonialists to the independence nationalist movement 
created a political vacuum of sorts. The government structures were immediately left 	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with a lack of capacity following the departure of expatriate staff from their 
administrative positions. Furthermore, the intellectual elite that formed the ruling 
party controlled the political system but not necessarily the economic system. This led 
to difficulties between the nationalist and traditional elite; unlike neighbouring 
countries, Tanzania’s independence movement was not dominated by a land-owning 
class meaning TANU could not leave them to determine the post-independence 
economic system.  
TANU needed to fulfil the previously made economic promises, TANU politicians 
had made substantial promises during the independence movement that would be 
impossible to fulfil126. Economic growth was considered the most successful way to 
establish internal legitimacy, particularly in the rural areas. Immediately following 
independence the severity of poverty and TANU’s internal structural fragility became 
a fatal mix. In 1961 people were realising what the actuality of independence meant 
and this was highlighted by people’s opinion of TANU; TANU was quickly regarded 
as only a means of achieving independence127. Many ware made to believe, for 
example, that after independence taxes would be eliminated, social welfare would 
immediately be implemented, and that foreigners would be sent out of the country128. 
TANU was, therefore, facing a difficult period in the early 1960s, both internally 
within the party and with regard to popular support. This challenge within the party 
created serious strains for the government and must not be underestimated. This 
highlights the relevance of the ‘ sovereignty theory’ and the need to shift the focus 
away from blaming TANU and the new government and towards an idea for the 
future based on collective hard work in the form of a popular ideology.  
Internal strain within TANU in the early 1960s forced Nyerere to resign as Prime 
Minister. Up until 1961 TANU was organised centrally and was rather undemocratic. 
The tension in the party was between the political leaders who had been voted into the 
new government and TANU leaders who had made promises throughout the country. 
Additional strains were a result of discussions on race. Nyerere’s willingness to work 
with both Asians and Europeans in government categorised him as a moderate with 
regard to race issues. In his speeches, however, Nyerere always avoided the race issue 	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and emphasised anti-imperialism and pan-Africanism129. The racial issue led to the 
expulsion of European members of the cabinet, personally invited into government by 
Nyerere, on the same day that Nyerere intended to announce that non-Africans would 
be allowed membership of TANU. The next day Nyerere announced his resignation. 
Arguably, Nyerere’s resignation prevented an inevitable split within the government. 
The declaration that Tanzania would become a republic was made very soon after; 
much sooner that Nyerere had previously intended130. It can be concluded, therefore, 
that the declaration was an attempt by Nyerere and TANU leaders to regain control of 
the government and the political discussions that threatened internal party unity. The 
creation of a republic placed TANU under firm leadership once again making room 
for discussions on future policy; this reflects the ‘actor or strategy theory’.  
An additional and crucial aim of Nyerere’s resignation was to refocus on TANU’s 
support throughout the country. TANU had started losing touch with its offices in the 
rural areas and needed to re-establish contact with the villages131. During a press 
statement on 22 January 1962 to explain his resignation Nyerere announced that “it is 
[TANU’s] firm belief that this is the best way of achieving our new objective – the 
creation of a country in which the people take a full and active part in the fight against 
poverty, ignorance, and disease”. He continued that to achieve this it was “necessary 
to have a strong political organization active in every village, which acts like a two-
way all-weather road, along which purposes, plans and problems of the Government 
can travel to the people, at the same time as the ideas, desires, and misunderstandings 
of the people can travel direct to the government”132.  
An additional explanation is that the creation of a republic was a step taken by many 
one-time British Colonies and, therefore, an important illustration that political 
independence was truly realised; political connections with the British Crown were 
formally cut133. In November 1962 Presidential elections were held. Colin Leys 
predicted in 1962 that if elected as President, Nyerere’s resignation “will have been of 
purely tactical value and several of the longstanding problems which his 	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independence position as President of TANU offers him an opportunity of solving 
will recur”134. TANU was now in a position to establish ideological and policy-
making goals without too much influence from internal party struggles.  
Although TANU had nearly one million members by 1960, only 36% of eligible 
voters registered for the elections in 1962 and of these 63% voted. TANU had little 
choice but to explain this as an illustration of the population’s confidence in a TANU 
victory, rather than a lack of political interest135. TANU needed to rapidly establish a 
strong sense of nation, a political ideology and the structure that the post-
independence political system would take in order to survive. This became especially 
crucial after TANU and Nyerere faced their biggest threat following a mutiny of the 
army’s First and Second Battalion in January 1964. Just three years earlier Nyerere 
had reassured international spectators of Tanzania’s independence that the army 
mutiny in Congo would not be repeated in Tanzania. Although able to bring the 
mutiny under control, this was an unexpected and sudden threat to the ruling party’s 
internal legitimacy136. National unity created by the independence nationalist 
movement was less widespread than Nyerere and TANU had thought. In the post-
independence period Nyerere’s slogans emphasised African socialism, without this 
officially becoming TANU’s ideology. Between independence and 1966 it became 
evident that TANU was searching for a party ideology137.  
Tanzania’s democratic structure was impacted by both internal and external factors; 
including western views, Eastern European influenced communist ideas, and 
traditional African ideas. Nyerere was fundamental in the creation of the post-
independence structure, both political and cultural, and was essential for TANU 
policy-making138. In 1962 Tanzania was named a republic and following “the 
deposition of chiefs, the proscribing or collapsing of opposition political movements 
and the definition of national policy in matters of local government – 1963 had been a 
year of attempting to patch up the wounds in the body politic and to establish a new 
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administrative structure”139. By 1964 Tanzania had practically become a one-party 
state due to lack of opposition and limited possibility for political discussions, but the 
biggest issue remained, how could this one-party governing system work 
democratically, something Nyerere strongly believed was necessary?  
5.2 The creation of a single-party state 
Nyerere’s political ideology was affected by the colonial period, his knowledge of 
pre-colonial African structures, his education in political philosophy in Edinburgh, 
and the Cold War bipolar political system. The racial suppression during colonialism 
and the elitist society created by the colonial economic system created a deep-rooted 
dislike for economic and social inequality. Nyerere understood the pre-colonial 
African societies as a classless society, which had evolved into ‘primitive 
communalist’ systems prior to the arrival of the imperialists. Nyerere’s education in 
the United Kingdom influenced him greatly. Nyerere was educated on western 
democracy and believed that it was important to learn from existing systems and 
adapt them to fit into the African context. He felt that the western form of democracy 
could not fit into the African model but thought it necessary to learn from other 
systems and see what would allow Tanzania to achieve its goals. This together with 
his knowledge of Marxism and socialism greatly influenced his and therefore 
TANU’s policy-making. Lastly, Nyerere’s democratic ideas were influenced by the 
Cold War political antagonism, which further influenced his eventual emphasis on 
self-reliance regarding Tanzania’s economic and social development. The Cold War 
proved to Nyerere that this global antagonism played an integral part in the leadership 
and politics in many developing countries, and that the superpowers were actively 
influencing policy-making. Tanzania wanted to distance itself from Cold War politics; 
examples had shown that where the superpowers had interfered civil war existed. The 
Cold War showed Nyerere the importance of not simply adopting what other 
countries had already done but to alter the existing institutions to fit into the 
Tanzanian context140.  
By 1964 Tanzania was a single-party state in practice due to a lack of serious 
opposition and within the context of African socialism, Nyerere argued that the 	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western democratic system of multi-party democracy could not fit into the Tanzanian 
system for three reasons: firstly, the building up for a new country and government 
requires nation-wide collaboration to achieve economic and social development; 
secondly, traditional African societies advocate unanimity in decision-making, ““they 
talk till they agree”141; and thirdly, Nyerere felt that multi-party politics creates a 
political game in which social and economic inequalities are worsened by 
emphasising differences within society, this resulting in political instability142. 
Nyerere argued that, 
“Where there is one party and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, 
the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have 
two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community”143.   
Democracy was associated with political competition and rifts within society. In a 
period of political legitimisation and survival, national unity was considered pivotal 
and anything that could challenge this was rejected. Furthermore, for Nyerere 
democracy meant discussion, and this did not need to take place within a multi-party 
framework. 
Nyerere’s image of African socialism envisaged an egalitarian and communal society 
that is the product of mass public participation as opposed to elitist party politics. A 
direct dialogue between the population and government would result to discuss how 
to achieve the goals; the goals, however, would not be under discussion as there was a 
nation-wide consensus that equality and the economic and social development of 
Tanzania were the goals144. There was no public discussion or choice on the decision 
that Tanzania was to become a one-party state, and all citizens of Tanzania were to 
become members of TANU. As illustrated in a statement made by Paul Bomani to the 
Mwanza District Council in 1963, “TANU was the foundation of the government 
itself; and the government was the ‘result of,’ the ‘branches of,’ the ‘property of’, the 
‘child of’ TANU”145. Any public participation needed to be done within the 
boundaries of TANU ideology and policy; criticism of the political system and 	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ideology was not welcomed or taken seriously. Mass public participation was, 
arguably, never achieved.  
The Tanzanian government system therefore kept the liberal idea of the nation-state 
but turned it into a single-party system146. According to Harvey Glickman, argued in 
1965, politicians referred to their political choices as contributing to ‘nation-building’. 
The modern liberal idea of the state according to TANU required unity, participation, 
widespread engagement of leaders, and nationwide welfare. TANU felt that a single 
pillar of authority was required to drive and control social and economic 
development. For TANU nation building was contingent on the effectiveness with 
which the party and government were merged as tools for development147. Tanzania’s 
political national identity was, therefore, based around the strong relationship between 
the government and the party. This contrasts the nationalist identity from the political 
national identity. 
In 1965 the constitution was revised to officially declare a one-party state and name 
TANU as the only political party; all political policy and activities were now to be 
regulated by TANU. This meant that the party played a role in all government 
decision-making. The NEC was given a new level of power; it could now question 
government policy and laws. Hence, TANU now had access to immense financial 
resources and the support of the entire government to implement its objectives and 
ideological policies148. Whilst the NEC discussed policy questions and goals the 
national assembly discussed how to implement these. In fact the decision to become a 
republic was discussed and decided within the NEC before it was mentioned to the 
national assembly149. The NEC therefore had more power than the national assembly.  
Nonetheless, the shift to one-party state was not only made in Tanzania. As 
Ndabaningi Sithole, one of Zimbabwe’s independence leaders argued in 1968, many 
African leaders and intellectuals promoted the single-party state. Not only was the 
multiple-party system not present in Africa’s history, but also the party system in 
general had never been present in the pre-colonial period. Additionally, the one-party 
system, as was argued by TANU, would allow the government to focus on economic 	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and social development. Sithole further emphasised that opposition parties would 
open up the possibility for neo-colonial involvement in the country’s politics. Multi-
party state systems that had been set up in independent African states had also failed, 
according to Sithole150. The fact that this occurred in numerous African states reflects 
the universality argument of the 1960s, although distinct differences in the way this 
happened and the political system that resulted are present. 
5.3 Identifying a national party ideology 
Following the transition to a one-party state system, TANU now had to legitimise the 
move and its government. To do this TANU needed to define a new set of objectives 
that would replace ‘Uhuru’. African socialism, freedom and hard work had repeatedly 
been mentioned by Nyerere but without clear statements of what this would bring. In 
the face of difficulty, TANU realised the importance of a national ideology to deflect 
criticism, control expectations and focus on the future through popular national 
rhetoric. According to Ian Parker, ideologies can be grouped into ‘innovative’ and 
‘conservative’. The former intending to use an opportunity and identified by a 
readiness for change, and the latter aimed at protecting against a threat and identified 
by emphasising stability. Throughout this chapter the extent to which TANU’s 
ideology fits into these groups will be analysed.  
Moreover, Ian Parker’s argument on the importance of an existing national identity, 
through historical factors, for the implementation of ideology is relevant. His earlier 
described factors for an existing national heritage arguably have allowed ideology to 
play a crucial role as means for development in Tanzania151. The traditional African 
society has formed the basis of TANU’s and Nyerere’s view of African socialism and 
emphasis on self-reliance. This formed the basis of the party’s efforts to link the 
institutional transition to its party ideology152. Ideology in Tanzania had become 
instrumental for the creation of policy. 
It has been argued that Nyerere is similar to Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of 
India, to the extent that both were comfortable in European-style political systems. 
Even with the emphasis on traditional African society, the modern state remained 	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central to TANU ideology. Nyerere viewed the traditional African society as socialist 
because it emphasised sharing amongst society. The Ujamaa ideology became a mix 
of modern and anti-modern ideas. Traditional allegiance was used by TANU to gain 
support for its ideology by placing it within the type of society that the population 
understood153. Within this context Ujamaa was used to legitimise the one-party state. 
Furthermore, Nyerere hoped to moderate expectations by illustrating that change 
would not occur immediately but would require hard work154. 
By 1963 the idea of African Socialism, or Ujamaa, had been outlined. Ujamaa was 
both anti-capitalist and anti-socialist. Capitalism “seeks to build a happy society on 
the basis of the exploitation of man by man,” whilst socialism “seeks to build its 
happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man”. Rather, 
“modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of 
‘society’ as an extension of the basic family unit”155. The NEC officially adopted 
Ujamaa as party ideology in Arusha on 29 January 1967, also named the Arusha 
Declaration and was founded on the two pillars, socialism and self-reliance. It defined 
a socialist society as lacking exploitation, where the majority of production is in the 
hands of peasants and workers, the presence of democracy, and where socialism is 
perceived as a way of life. Additionally, the declaration emphasised that TANU was 
in a state of war against poverty. The only way to tackle poverty is not to use money 
but to rely on hard-work and national resources, the pillar of self-reliance. With 
regard to foreign aid, the declaration acknowledged its necessity but that it is “stupid, 
for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of our poverty through foreign financial 
assistance rather than our own financial resources”. This illustrates that TANU not 
only understood they would not receive sufficient funds but also because they felt it 
would endanger their independence, “independence means self-reliance”. Lastly, the 
declaration put the emphasis back on agriculture and its majority peasant population. 
Agriculture was acknowledged as the backbone for development156. 
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The characteristics of Nyerere’s writings in the early 1960s came down to ‘fighting 
exploitation’, what was termed ‘parasitism’ or unyonyaji in Swahili, stopping income 
differences, organising the population to tackle poverty, and supporting political 
discussion and some criticism. Nyerere particularly emphasised the fight against the 
parasitism of people living off other people’s work, for example landlords. These 
characteristics quickly formed part of a national language. Ideas such as fighting 
parasitism were celebrated by the population. After years of colonial exploitation this 
could be related to, particularly in the cities. James Brennan argues, however, that 
both Nyerere and the population did not really seek the return of the traditional 
African society that formed the basis of Ujamaa. It was popular rhetoric because it 
emphasised heritage and culture but people still wanted to modernise and develop. 
This is significant because Ujamaa was able to create national popular discussions 
that emphasised the past whilst looking towards a modern future, getting the support 
of all generations and peoples. Political attention was paid to who could be considered 
part of the Ujamaa family. After 1963 and especially after 1967 the use of unyonyaji 
increased after TANU defined these terms in the Arusha Declaration. Unyonyaji 
became unyonyaji na mirija translated as ‘sucking by straws’ and referring to 
exploitation. TANU defined mnyonyaji, an exploiter, someone who lived without 
working and, therefore, “lives off the sweat of others”. Terms such as unyonyaji 
“transformed national citizenship from passive legal right to conscious political 
act”157. The national rhetoric could be spoken by everyone and became part of 
popular slang and therefore day-to-day discussions and life. The political ideology 
became ingrained in society and therefore difficult to refute and criticise. 
Ujamaa was, therefore, not only the new Tanzanian ideology but also formed the 
political platform for discussion. By explaining everything in terms of the African 
family and society, Tanzanian villagers, approximately 80% of the population158, 
were able to take part in political debates. Additionally, it allowed the political elite to 
understand and respect the Tanzanian villager’s circumstances159. TANU understood 
that the Tanzanian villager played an important role in the legitimisation of its 
government. Thus, the gap between TANU’s central ideology, created and already 
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rooted in the urban areas, and the typical Tanzanian farmer needed to be bridged. A 
widespread education system, and development programmes in the rural areas were 
considered the best way to spread its ideals. Education received a planned expenditure 
of 18% of the total in the Government’s Three Year Plan 1961-1964 and the Five 
Year Plan following160. Education was used in the establishment of a national identity 
and for nation building. Both primary and secondary school education curricula 
highlighted the Tanzanian general history, culture, values and heritage and instilled a 
strong feeling of national and pan-African identity. The use of Swahili was introduced 
in areas where it was not used as the mother tongue. By the second half of the 1960s 
political education was a normal subject in both primary and secondary schools and 
by the 1970s teachers needed to take part in the paramilitary national service 
organisation, which introduced them to the principals of the government and its 
ideology. Additionally, resources were equally distributed across regions, not 
favouring one particular are over another161. Tanzania as a nation thus became 
politically aware of Ujamaa and only Ujamaa, creating a political national identity 
based on the ideals of Ujamaa. This is why today Ujamaa is still difficult to let go of 
because it is the only political ideas the older generations trust. As Dr. Salim Ahmed 
Salim stated, the population is conservative and traditional and are afraid of the 
unknown and the possible chaos this will create162. 
The elimination of tribal, ethic and religious differences that could result in conflict 
was an important part of TANU’s nationalist ideology and Ujamaa. Ujamaa was able 
to bring people together despite religious differences. Religion was an important issue 
due to the predominance of both Christianity and Islam. Ujamaa did not adopt the 
socialist doctrine with regard to the disregarding of religion. Nyerere mixed religious 
discourse into the ideology. This way TANU was able to create and use this ideology 
to meet his needs within the government. Religion was regarded as a social 
organisation and included into umbrella organisations, which worked almost as partial 
ministries for the government. Nyerere attempted to remove any religious prejudice 
from government. Ujamaa was, therefore, a secular ideology but “created a form of 
civil religion that imposed enforceable ethical standards in the form of a socialist 	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leadership code for Tanzanian politicians”163. Neither tribes nor religions felt ignored 
and rather than suppressed religions were encouraged to cooperate. This has resulted 
in a religiously stable country for the past decades and is only now becoming a 
political issue creating uncertainty. 
Tribal and ethnic affiliations were equally worrying for the post-independence 
government. Many of these affiliations had weakened during the independence period 
in part as a result of the nationalist discourse. TANU’s distrust for tribalism and 
ethnicity increased with the violence breaking out in Congo and the threat of ethnic 
violence in both Kenya and Uganda. In the month before independence TANU 
therefore announced that their policy was to contain any political parties based on 
tribal or religious affiliations. During Chief’s Convention in 1961 prior to 
independence, held to discuss post-independence ‘native administration’ issues, 
Nyerere argued that the traditional Chief system was unsuited for the modern 
democratic political system. After independence, ethnic movements were watched 
carefully and struggled to register. By 1963 all Chief offices had been banned. In 
fewer than five years TANU had been able to basically eradicate other formal sources 
of ethnic authority164. This mixture of modern and anti-modern views of ideology is 
also present when looking at TANU’s centralised and decentralised image of 
government policy. Although ethnic-based organisations were not permitted, and 
traditional authorities and tribal laws were disassembled, TANU wanted to strengthen 
village and district councils. The local government institutions were, thus, completely 
altered. Villages now had elected village councils165. The government was quite 
centralised with the abolition of tribal decision-making channels and authorities, and 
policy was dictated from above. Nevertheless, in order to allow for input from the 
foundations of Tanzanian society, the villages, these village councils were set up. This 
highlights the balance between modern and traditional policy in TANU’s struggle for 
legitimacy. 
Opposition to TANU came about between 1960 and 1965. After independence the 
peasants and workers, who had been highlighted as key for economic growth, had not 
experienced the benefits of independence. Whilst they saw others becoming relatively 	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richer, the government struggled to explain why this was the case. It had become 
difficult to criticise decisions made by TANU and the government, however. TANU 
considered criticism as being deceitful to the party that had given the country 
independence. Although in theory mass public participation was encouraged, in 
reality the government and often the population frowned upon this; arguably, this is a 
result of the national rhetoric. People who criticised were called ‘colonialists’ or 
‘traitors’. As a result, individual opposition was intimidated. Under the one-party state 
people were said to be free to criticise but as they did not know when this would be 
considered opposition, this created anxiety for TANU members. Moreover, the 
Preventive Detention Act of 1962 gave the authorities the right to arrest anyone who 
was seen as a threat. More than just political opposition and criticism fell under this. 
The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) was used to control opposition. 
NUTA was a subsidiary organisation of TANU and controlled the trade union 
movement. NUTA, therefore, was not a free trade union. Similarly, the government 
took control over the peasants’ cooperative organisation, and reorganised it to become 
a quasi-government department. Ujamaa and the one-party state based on the ideas of 
equality, democracy, freedom and unity, contradicted the actuality of the political 
structure166. The state controlled large parts of society; this became evident with the 
implementation of the villigaisation policy mentioned below. TANU political and 
ideological hegemony had been achieved. This had not been a given, however. In 
1983 when Nyerere was asked what his greatest achievement was ten years after the 
Arusha Declaration he replied, “the fact that we have survived”167. Although public 
participation and discussion were named fundamental, arguably the quest for 
legitimacy and political survival overruled this, supporting the sovereignty theory.  
The government attempted to implement Ujamaa through the villagisation policy. 
Between 1968 and 1975 a majority of the rural population was resettled into 
communal villages. The idea behind villagisation was that by working together 
resources and knowledge could be combined to improve the collective quality of life. 
Nyerere believed that this would increase surplus, by replacing the large number of 
subsistence farmers, and make modern machinery more affordable for all. By 1976 
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between 7,000 and 8,000 villages were the result affecting around 70% of the 
population. This was achieved through forced resettlement, after voluntary movement 
yielded little results. Although its aim was to improve lives, overall production was 
reduced in the short and long term and the quality of life failed to improve168. 
Villagisation did not get ideological support in the rural areas; forced resettlement 
created resentment. In 1974 Tanzania had to import over 400,000 tonnes of maize; the 
collective villages had produced only one months supply of maize169. 
Although Ujamaa as a national ideology was implemented to legitimise rule and 
create stability, it was created to fit into Tanzania’s cultural heritage and nationalist 
ideology. African socialism and policies such as villagisation, although unsuccessful, 
were an attempt to create change and improve the quality of life. Ujamaa as an 
ideology can therefore be grouped as both ‘innovative’ and ‘conservative’ because it 
was unique and it can be argued that Nyerere’s aim was to improve the lives of 
Tanzanians, but it was also used to control society and criticism, and to shift focus 
towards future goals rather than immediate discontent. This is a reflection of the 
‘sovereignty theory’. 
The questions can be posed whether the single-party, African socialist state is a 
uniquely Tanzanian democracy? This system of a single-party state and an ideology 
enforced upon the population bears resemblances to authoritarian rule. TANU, 
however, felt accountable towards the population, and although unsuccessful its 
policies aimed at improving the livelihoods of its majority peasant population. 
Criticism was marginally tolerated as long as fundamental ideas and the system were 
not criticised, and political activity outside the ruling party was strictly prohibited. It 
is difficult, therefore, to categorise Tanzania’s one-party state as strictly authoritarian. 
Sklar’s defined ‘social’ and ‘guided’ democracy provides a good way of defining its 
system. It was ‘guided’ in that it was accountable towards the population and ‘social’ 
because it went beyond accountability and attempted to achieve social equality. 
Ujamaa and the single-party state are unique in that its leaders attempted to place a 
democratic government based on African principles within a modern state system. 	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The Tanzanian system cannot be categorised as a liberal democracy under the 
procedural definition because there were no competitive elections.  
5.4 The post-independence political national ideology 
The post-independence political national ideology is an amalgamation of the different 
aspects of Ujamaa; socialism and self-reliance play a crucial part. Furthermore, the 
political national ideology was created on the idea of the one-party state and 
legitimised using aspects of Tanzania’s traditional culture. Ujamaa was automatically 
deep-rooted within society because it represented one of the first times the population 
had the opportunity to take part in the political discussions, particularly in the 
villages, albeit limited within set ideological boundaries. Discussions only took place 
within the context of Ujamaa. The population did not seem to mind, however, 
because the ideology chosen reflected the majority’s wishes. This is still the case to an 
extent today, highlighting how well established the political national identity is. 
Nevertheless, a lack of both opposition and the possibility for critical discussion on 
government and party policy meant the population as a whole did not hear or 
participate in critical discussions. 
The political discourse and new metaphors and rhetoric introduced by Ujamaa spread 
throughout society rapidly. The government and party were not able to, however, 
completely control this nationalist discourse. Groups were refused from the Ujamaa 
family, taken from Ujamaa or ‘family-hood’; this was particularly the case with the 
Asian communities in Dar es Salaam. Emma Hunter has argued that although a lack 
of any oppositional dialogue may illustrate that the government controlled this 
nationalist discourse, the discussions in rural areas illustrates that debates on society 
and the state continued. These debates were not strongly politically motivated, 
however, and did not attempt to significantly alter the system. Rather, Ujamaa and 
political metaphors provided a platform for debating moral issues and what society 
should look like, within its ideological boundaries. Tanzanians were shown that they 
had Tanzania’s future in their hands. Collective hard work would result in economic 
growth, and although important, individual education was not the most important. 
Contributing to the country but developing its agricultural resources was even 
regarded as your duty made you significant, perhaps more than education could. 
Ujamaa both explained the problems and solutions in a way that the majority of the 
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population could discuss and agree with170. Importantly, these discussions rarely went 
beyond TANU and the one-party state, and rather remained within the boundaries of 
Ujamaa, socialism and self-reliance. The space of these discussions only started to 
open up among Tanzanian scholars and politicians in the mid to late 1980s.   
Political metaphors were important for legitimisation and the creation of a political 
national identity. Dialogue alone, however, could not solve the political legitimacy 
issue171. The role of the government in enforcing policies, controlling organisations 
and the education system played a crucial role in ensuring the spread of this 
nationwide political identity.   
Though the main ideas of socialism and self-reliance were ingrained, villagers had 
very different experiences with Ujamaa, and particularly with regard to the 
villagisation policies. In villages self-reliance was understood quite differently 
between people. Older peasants, for example, defined self-reliance as separate from 
the Tanzanian nation and saw it as ‘depending on yourself’. Here self-reliance is seen 
as a principal part of the rural tradition, instead of an aspect of government and party 
policy. Nonetheless, older peasants who participated in the independence movements 
saw Ujamaa as a fundamental aspect of national citizenship separate from local 
tradition. Furthermore, the TANU youth in villages were especially committed to 
Ujamaa as the Tanzanian national identity. This is important because it was a few 
TANU officials who implemented Ujamaa and villagisation policies in the rural areas 
but its policies and education system spread the support base rapidly. Before the 
Arusha Declaration villagers were less passionate about TANU and a Tanzanian 
nation than the urban populations. Importantly, this illustrated how Ujamaa both 
created and fit into a national identity, encompassing the entire population into its 
ideals and goals; Ujamaa successfully bridged the gap between urban and rural 
populations. Although not always linked to government policy, the traditional factor 
of Ujamaa was still deep-rooted172. Everyone today still knows what Ujamaa 
constitutes and many preferred it remained mentioned in the new constitution as 
Tanzania’s morals and ideals rather than political orientation. 
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Having established that Ujamaa created a political national identity by combining 
traditional life to nationalist rhetoric that was deep-rooted in society, even when 
certain aspects were interpreted differently, and that this occurred the way it did 
because of a desperate need for internal legitimacy, the question can be asked how 
this aided or hindered the development of democracy. Although this will become 
evident in chapter 7, when the transition to multi-party democracy will be discussed, 
the lack of serious political discussion within the general public throughout the post-
independence period is crucial. The education system and government control over 
unions and organisation instilled an idea for the need for a strong link between the 
government and the state. The political national identity created support for the 
political system and government party. Therefore, arguments in favour of a multi-
party system were not made often; Tanzania’s history and a fear for possible conflict, 
made the population believe that African socialism was the best way to achieve the 
nation’s collective objectives. Importantly, both nationally and internationally many 
were not as critical of Ujamaa and TANU as they could have been, largely because of 
the likability of its leader. Ali Mazrui has named this phenomenon Tanzaphilia. 
Nyerere was relatable to western scholars because although not more pro-western 
than other leaders, his manner reflected his western-style education.  Additionally, 
Ujamaa created another form of favouritism; its ideas of equality, freedom and self-
reliance were difficult to argue with on a moral level173. Tanzania became a Dutch 
and Nordic donor darling in the 1970s. It was believed Ujamaa embraced the idea of 
social democracy, perhaps in a way that was more utopian and no longer possible in 
Sweden or the Netherlands. 
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6. The Transition to Multi-Party Democracy 
Outlining the transition to multi-party democracy in Tanzania provides an additional 
characterisation of how the creation of a political national identity has shaped 
Tanzania’s democratic development. Importantly, whether this aided or hindered the 
transition and the effect that this has had on the current political situation in Tanzania 
becomes evident when analysing the political change in the early 1990s. 
6.1 The transition paradigm 
In the early 1990s sub-Saharan Africa experienced widespread democratic transitions 
of political systems. In fact, by the late 1990s most of the sub-Saharan governments 
had political representatives from at least two different parties174. These transitions 
happened suddenly and scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Robert Dahl and 
Michael Bratton had not expected these changes for at least another decade175. This, 
together with the transitions experienced in Eastern Europe and South America 
resulted in the emergence of a theory to explain these sudden transitions; the 
‘transition paradigm’. The ‘transition paradigm’ has five central notions. These 
include: (1) any move away from authoritarianism is automatically moving towards 
democracy; (2) democracy occurs in stages including the opening of the discussion, 
the political breakthrough and finally the consolidation of democratic rule; (3) 
elections are fundamental for democracy; (4) structural factors such as political 
history, economic circumstances, or political culture are not elementary in the 
transition; and (5) democratic transitions are occurring in countries with stable, 
working states, therefore, democracy and state-building would strengthen one 
another. 
The ‘transition paradigm’ is no longer valuable for comprehending the political 
changes. The transitions had surprised many scholars, resulting in the necessity for an 
explanation of what was occurring; this explanation was too simplistic, however. 
Most of the countries have not transitioned into a western definition of a liberal 
democracy. These have stopped somewhere in between an authoritarian regime and a 
liberal democracy, or ‘gray zone’, often also termed ‘partial-democracies’ or ‘pseudo-	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democracies’. Although elections take place regularly, the level of public 
participation is lacking. This means that the political space is restricted, what Thomas 
Carothers terms ‘dominant-power politics’. The president or political elite controls the 
system as well as state resources. These systems often have a certain level of stability, 
making it difficult to shift away from this dominant political system. 
The notion that structural factors do not play a role in the transition process was 
founded on the idea that the pronouncement by political elite was sufficient for the 
transition to democracy. This illustrates the rejection of the modernisation theory in 
the 1990s. The Cold War had generated the idea in the US that democracy was not 
suited for many developing countries, backing the US’ support for anti-communist 
dictators. As illustrated in the historiography section, this shift had already started 
with Dankwart Rustow’s ‘no preconditions’ argument in the 1970s176. Arguments that 
democracy could be formed under all degrees of economic development became 
prominent. The ‘actor or strategy perspective’ became important, with scholars such 
as Van de Walle arguing that structural arguments hold no weight because sub-
Saharan countries are similar economically but very different politically, and that 
individuals played a fundamental role177. The end of the Cold War and the bipolar 
system, therefore, opened up the space for new discussion on democratic transitions 
in sub-Saharan Africa. This discursive space was also opened in Tanzania. Although 
the transition process in Tanzania was started by political leaders, structural factors 
including the political national identity were the reason its political systems is today 
still a de facto one-party state or stuck in the gray zone. The transition paradigm is, 
therefore, too simplistic to explain Tanzania’s transition.  
Shivji has made the argument that Tanzania did not experience a transition from an 
authoritarian to a democratic state because the transition itself was initiated from the 
top thus preempting a possible movement from the bottom. It was compradorial 
because it was done under the tutelage of imperialism. Although there were some 
positive aspects, such as the opening up of the media, the private media quickly got 
captured by monopoly houses on the one hand and foreign interests on the other. Thus 
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it became a transition from state nationalist authoritarian rule to neo-liberal 
compradorial rule178. 
Shivji’s argument that African political systems are ‘compradorial’ and therefore not 
‘revolutionary’ because they are based on the state system is arguably difficult to 
support within the realistic political context. For Shivji the current political system is 
based on the ‘western’ state system and is therefore ‘imperial’ and not 
‘revolutionary’. For Shivji not being ‘revolutionary’ means not being democratic. 
Within the current globalised world it is difficult, however, to imagine what this 
‘revolutionary’, ‘non-imperialist’ system would be. Shivji’s argument takes on a 
‘them’ and ‘us’ stance, whereas it can be questioned whether the state system can still 
today be termed western as opposed to global. This is a philosophical way of 
approaching Tanzania’s political system. Although a transition did occur, under 
Shivji’s definition of democracy this was not a transition to democracy. Analysing 
Tanzania’s transition with both the ‘transition paradigm’ and Shivji’s argument in 
mind can help determine the extent of change, why it occurred and how the political 
national identity affected the transition.  
6.2 Political discussion from the mid-1980s onwards  
Tanzania had a one-party political system since 1965, under which the executive had 
absolute power. The president appointed members of the Cabinet, was himself chair 
of the Cabinet, and appointed a number of parliamentarians. The civil service also fell 
under the government, therefore, the president could nominate or displace anyone he 
pleased. Parliament did not have the power to remove the President from office; the 
president instead could disband the Parliament at any moment. In the constitution the 
presidential power was limited by party supremacy. This had been strengthened 
throughout the constitutions since independence, in 1965 the ‘auspices’ of the party 
was described, in 1977 the constitution mentioned ‘guidance’ and the 1984 
constitution stated that the party had ‘final authority’. The president had, nevertheless, 
also been the president of the ruling party, CCM, since independence. Conflict 
between the president and the party was, therefore, unlikely. The constitution, thus, 
gave the National Executive Committee (NEC) more power than the government. 	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Tanzania’s one-party system contrasts with other neighbouring African one-party 
states foremost because of the political culture of avoiding conflict and striving for 
unity within the government. Furthermore, Tanzania’s political culture includes 
relatively little conflicts among its leadership. Unlike Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe or 
Malawi, who each had big disputes between leaders, these types of major disputes 
were not experienced in Tanzania. Until the late 1980s Tanzania’s political culture 
was structured around a powerful president encircled by a unified cluster of 
politicians that together controlled political institutions. Personal relations with the 
president were more beneficial for politicians than institutional positioning. This 
created a strong political culture of unity. It cannot, however, be said that this evolved 
out of internal government repression. Most cabinet ministers were removed as a 
result of personal scandals, rather than deposed by the President. Moreover, 
Tanzania’s political stability and the fact that many ministers remained in power for 
an extended period of time meant that there was sufficient possibility to create a 
personal strong political support. Most ministers, however, took on a no-risk political 
stance. This evasion of conflict was, arguably, an attribute of Tanzanian society as a 
whole. It was characteristic for Tanzanian peasants to try and avoid the state, meaning 
stay away from political conflict. In the 1980s Tanzania experienced high inflation, 
food crises, and a foreign-exchange disaster, in contrast with some other African 
countries this did not cause violent or mass hostilities with the government179. Perhaps 
the reason for this is Tanzania’s ideology and the idea that the government had their 
interests at hand. Another possible explanation is that the population felt protesting 
would not result in any serious change after decades of relative little ideological 
criticism and change. 
The discussion for the need for a transition to multi-party politics, therefore, came 
from the government, rather than the people, fitting in with the ‘transition paradigm’s’ 
argument that political leaders are crucial, and fitting within the ‘actor or strategy 
perspective’. Gero Erdmann argues that Tanzania’s democratisation is ‘guided’ in that 
all changes are introduced, directed and managed by the government. Meaning that 
the party can exploit the changes to its own benefit. This was possible because CCM 
never faced any capable opposition. Until 1992 the state controlled most aspects of 	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society, including the media. As mentioned in the introduction, this top-down, 
‘guided’ transition prevented opposition from organising before the transition started. 
It was a CCM proposal, thus allowing the party to maintain political legitimacy180. 
For Shivji this, therefore, did not constitute a transition from authoritarian rule to 
democratic rule because it was initiated from the top thus pre-empting any movement 
from the bottom, without this bottom mass movement the system cannot be termed 
the democratic will of the people181. This can be criticised because although limited, 
the transition did increase democratic aspects of rule such as freedom of the media 
and to an extent the possibility of competitive elections.  
The space for discussion on the political system was opened in the 1980s following 
the economic decline in the mid-1970s; export declined rapidly and it became 
increasingly difficult to Tanzania to import important products. Pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank mounted for Tanzania to depart 
with African socialism and self-reliance, Nyerere, however, refused. In 1985 Nyerere 
stepped down as President and Ali Hassan Mwinyi was appointed President. Nyerere 
remained influential within CCM by remaining as chairman of the ruling party. This 
resignation gave the government room to adopt IMF and World Bank sponsored 
programmes, including the Economic Recovery Programme and later the Economic 
and Social Adjustment Programme aimed at reducing budget deficits and inflation, 
liberalising trade and reducing the size of the public sector. By 1989, however, 
inflation remained at around 30% and unemployment and inequality increased, and 
wages decreased, resulting in a build up of some hostility towards the government. By 
1990 Nyerere realised that the government was losing its legitimacy and its touch 
with the population. In 1991 he resigned as chair of CCM and called for reforms 
towards political liberalisation182. Discussing a multi-party political system was no 
longer deemed traitorous. 
The transition process was, therefore, started as a result of both internal and external 
pressure. An independent National Steering Committee, including academics, 
students, political activists, lawyers etc., was organised to discuss possible future 	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systems. The committee then formed a National Committee for Constitutional Reform 
(NCCR), in February 1992, including a number of opposition figures, to demand 
change and discuss the possible future political system. One month later President 
Mwinyi formed a Presidential Commission, including representatives from the ruling 
party, government and private sector of Tanzania and Zanzibar. The government and 
CCM therefore quickly took the lead with regard to the transition. I.K. Musoke has 
argued that this entailed seizing control of democratic change process from the 
population, the ruling party stayed in control throughout the process183. Even though 
the Commission’s report illustrated that 77% of the people spoken to preferred the 
one-party state remained, the Commission concluded that a significant minority 
preferred a multi-party state system, and they needed to be included in the political 
discussion. CCM wanted a transition for several reasons. First, it argued that there 
was no longer a nationwide consensus of the suitability of the one-party state. Second, 
CCM respected democracy and human rights and did not want to deny political 
parties the right to participate. Third, to preserve peace, stability and unity transition 
was necessary in the changing world order. Fourth, democracy is a precondition for 
socialism; therefore, the one-party state was no longer the most suited for socialism 
and self-reliance184. Arguably CCM wanted to remain modern and ahead of possible 
opposition movements, to keep its legitimacy and future politically survival CCM 
understood it needed to modernise ahead of serious calls for change. 
The Political Parties Act was adopted in 1992, which called for the creation of the 
office of the Registrar of Political Parties within the Prime Minister’s office. The 
President was given the jurisdiction to the Registrar. Under the Political Parties Act 
all parties, except for the ruling CCM party, needed to register. Individuals were, 
therefore, not given the right to participate politically outside of a registered party. 
Though the Political Parties Act made Tanzania a de jure multi-party state, the 
regulations for political competition did not change much from the one-party state 
system. Of the fourteen registered political parties, only five were represented in the 
Union Parliament in 2002. Furthermore, in order to have an official opposition to the 
National Assembly twenty MPs are required. In November 2001 the Civic United 
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Front (CUF) removed three MPs for internal reasons, meaning CCM no longer had an 
official opposition. As is often stated, democratisation is more than just multi-party 
politics. A multi-party system cannot on its own make the government transparent and 
accountable to its people185.   
Placing Tanzania within the ‘transition paradigm’ it can be highlighted that the 
country’s leaders started the process, a ‘guided’ transition. Furthermore, Tanzania 
already had a strong state in comparison to its neighbours. Nonetheless, the de facto 
single-party states illustrates that it has remained in the gray zone. This is a result of 
the link between party and state and reflects the strong connection of the one-party 
state system with the political national identity. 
6.3 The political national identity and its effect on democratic development 
Tanzania’s ‘guided’ transition process has resulted in a continued link between the 
government and the ruling party. This is reflected in the inclusion of African 
socialism in the constitution, to consolidate a dominant party position following the 
transition. As a result of this link, opposition parties are unable to effectively compete 
in the political scene. Thirty years of single-party hegemony and the manner in which 
political decisions were made have resulted in a relatively oppressive political culture. 
No political discussions were allowed when writing the constitutions, power was 
centralised, civil society organisation such as trade unions and cooperatives were 
impeded, no Bill of Rights was included and CCM was the only entity able to make 
amendments to the constitutions for thirty years. Additionally, until 1992 the media 
were controlled entirely by CCM186. 
One result of Ujamaa and the one-party system that has often been categorised as 
very positive in comparison to other African countries is the stability, peace and unity 
created by the political system and party throughout the decades following 
independence. The profound fear for conflict was the main reason for a dislike of 
multi-party politics. In the survey done before the transition 60% saw multi-party 
politics as a risk to national unity, they feared the strengthening of tribal affiliations. 
People were not undemocratic; however, they just saw national unity as more 	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important than civil rights187. The conflict that resulted in neighbouring countries 
instilled fear within the population, this had repeatedly been emphasised within the 
political national identity. Reflecting on the arguments made in favour of a one-party 
system in the years following independence highlights this fear of conflict. TANU 
repeatedly referred to the need for a one-party system to remain unified, avoid 
conflict and allow for economic growth. This was taught in schools throughout the 
country, resulting in a relatively politically aware population. The population was 
familiar with the Ujamaa terms such as ‘exploitation’ and ‘oppression’188. In 1999 a 
presidential committee conducted research on the need for constitutional reform. It 
found that almost 89% of Tanzanians identified with Ujamaa and wanted it to remain 
in the constitution. Ujamaa although no longer used due to liberalising policies, is still 
an essential mobilising instrument for CCM. According to Alexander Makulilo most 
Tanzanians are not aware of the constitution, many government policies and how the 
multi-party system functions, particularly in the rural areas where about 80% of the 
population lives. Additionally, most Tanzanians do not understand their rights. This 
unawareness benefits CCM because farmers are usually only aware of CCM, Ujamaa 
and its rhetoric, and the political leaders that led them to independence. Unlike the 
new political system, the majority of relatively uneducated Tanzanians could 
understand Ujamaa as a part of its culture and history. Whilst most of those in rural 
areas are not necessarily politically active or interested, the political national identity 
and its rhetoric are ingrained. Even with growing criticism, this identity is difficult to 
separate from the ruling party and government189. 
Importantly, opposition parties did not have time to sufficiently organise themselves 
during the transition. They emphasised liberal democratic ideas but did not have any 
clear ideological platform or basic substitutes for CCM’s ideas. Opposition parties 
struggled to obtain a significant support base, particularly in the rural areas. This is 
largely also because they are unable to mobilise ethnic or tribal support. This is a 
result of the political national identity created by CCM. CCM leaders, also 
representing the elite in Tanzania, worked hard to ensure there was a regional balance 
with regard to interest groups. Gero Erdmann maintains that as long as CCM remains 	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unified, this will be difficult to overcome. This, combined with the passive 
comprehension of the role of individuals within the multi-party state, has made it 
difficult for opposition parties to obtain a solid following190. 
Although having had a landslide victory in all the Presidential elections since the 
transition, CCM has also struggled with the transition to a multi-party political 
system. Contrasting to Tanzania’s political movement of the last thirty years, the 
largest opposition parties have avoided adopting an ideology. Most parties have 
similar capitalist notions. This has created uncertainty as to what the parties stand for, 
and important what differentiates them. CCM has changed significantly in the last two 
decades following the transition. Its ideology of socialism and self-reliance is, 
therefore, outdated. Although it has attempted to re-stipulate its ideology, it is difficult 
to do this without criticising the last thirty years of its policy191. Socialism and self-
reliance is becoming more difficult to support, however, particularly whilst basic 
needs remain unmet and political debates in urban areas are increasing. CCM, 
therefore, altered is aims to now ensure people control the economy themselves, 
either individually or through organisations. This reflected a shift towards the use of 
the term post-socialism192. Most opposition parties have lacked the capacity to 
communicate an ideology, especially in the rural areas. This is now changing. 
Although never clearly stipulated, it can be deduced that NCCR-Mageuzi’ and 
Chadema are somehow social democratic, CUF emphasises individual human rights 
and enrichment, NLD denounces all ideologies and also emphasises the individual. Of 
these Chadema is most to the point and clear of its goals. Tanzania faces the task of 
creating “a new ‘social imagery,’ capable of carrying all the nationalist popular 
classes forward, and which will work independently, and even in defiance, of the 
dominant, seemingly invincible international capitalist imperialist vision”193.  
Nevertheless, Samwell Mushi maintains that Tanzania’s political culture has made the 
possibilities for democratic development better than in any other countries. This in 
part as a result of the stability created by the political national identity. The political 
national identity has given the population faith in the government and CCM; 	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therefore, the political system could change when CCM wanted it to, even when a 
majority of the population preferred it remained. The President is also changed every 
ten years since the transition. Therefore, changes can occur without the government 
falling apart. Negative, anti-democratic aspects of the one-party state legacy include 
that still today the power is distributed unequally among the three branches of 
government. Local authorities and institutions relinquish power to the central 
authorities. The one-party state system has given the public a wrong idea about 
authority; they see the president as having complete control. This is at times still 
misused by leaders and has made them intolerant of criticism. Leaders are also not 
used to having to compromise within government policy. Importantly, this has 
resulted in many officials and especially the general public as considering unity as a 
lack of opposition to policies and the authority of the ruling party. Lastly, corruption 
has altered the ideas of equality; specific groups are now receiving more focus than 
before, especially groups related to the leaders194. Tanzania’s political stability has 
resulted in a positive outlook for its future political system. The 2015 elections will 
most probably still be won by CCM, although it needs to sort out internal conflict and 
opposition parties will win more seats. The real threat to Tanzania’s stability lies in 
the increase in social unrest both based on economic and religious issues. The large 
gas finds off the southern coast of Tanzania has resulted in uprisings in the South, 
most probably politically motivated, with calls for an equal distribution of resources. 
This and a rise in religious violence have prompted the government to set up a 
genocide committee to look for indications of possible future genocide and educate 
the population on the risks195. This drastic response reflects real fear of possible 
conflict but can also be seen as a political move to reemphasise the threat of violence 
and what this means for national unity.  
Therefore, the political national identity based on socialism, self-reliance, unity and 
the one-party state hindered the creation of a competitive multi-party democratic 
system and aided in the establishment of a politically stable political system. This was 
a result of the way in which the transition occurred, rapidly and under the control of 
the ruling party, as well as persistence of the one-party state constitution. A lack of 
demand for change from the population is crucial in the continued de facto existence 	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of the single party-state in a multi-party system. In recent years there has been a 
steady move towards a more competitive political system, however. Twenty years 
following it is clear that the transition has allowed for restrained identities to 
resurface. Additionally, public debate within different communities throughout 
Tanzania is increasing. Nyerere’s Ujamaa legacy is no longer being implemented 
through government policy and economic reform is widespread, although its ideas 
remain rooted in rural society196.  
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis addresses Tanzania’s post-independence democratic development, 
principally how the creation of a political national identity has shaped Tanzania's 
democratic development, why this has occurred the way it has and whether this has 
assisted or hindered the eventual development of a multi-party system. The nationalist 
identity created by TANU during the independence movement and the political 
national identity and party ideology established from this in the post-independence 
period created ideological support for party and government policy. Through national 
rhetoric and the widely supported and understood ideology of African socialism, 
Ujamaa, support for the political system, and government and party policy was 
widespread. This influenced democratic development by creating a strong link 
between government and party, African socialism, and the one-party state. 
Assessing whether Tanzania can today be termed a democracy requires us to look at 
its development in context. Referring to the ‘sovereignty theory’, TANU needed to 
legitimise its rule in the post-independence period. This was achieved by using the 
nationalist ideology to establish a deep-rooted political national identity emphasising 
socialism and self-reliance. TANU argued that in order to successfully legitimise rule 
a one-party system was required. Tanzania’s one-party state system did not fit into the 
‘procedural definition’ of democracy as competitive elections did not occur and 
public participation was limited. Furthermore, referring to Issa Shivji’s ‘ideology of 
dominance’, the population never determined the political system through mass 
struggle. The one-party state was forced upon them, albeit with little resistance. The 
modern state system was never questioned, however. Tanzania’s single-party 
democracy, or ‘guided’ or ‘social’ democracy, is unique in that its leaders attempted 
to place a democratic government based on African principles within a modern state 
system. Although not a democracy under the ‘procedural definition’, the government 
felt accountable towards the population. This system allowed African scholars to 
challenge western liberal democratic thinking and the modernisation theory in the 
1960s, known as the ‘Dar es Salaam School’.  
Nevertheless, the changing political world order as well as internal pressure caused 
the ruling party, CCM, to rapidly start the process of transitioning towards multi-party 
politics, and in turn liberal economic reform. The manner in which this was done, 
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with CCM in control, allowed the ruling party to maintain political legitimacy in the 
period following. CCM’s political national identity and thirty years of one-party rule, 
resulting in the fusing of party and state, have resulted in an uneven political playing 
field for the last twenty years of multi-party rule. Abuse of state has occurred 
frequently and the opposition has been unable to organise effectively. This is largely 
because of unequal access to resources, the media and the law; CCM was able to 
maintain access to its resources following the transition. Without giving up its internal 
and external legitimacy, the state and ruling party have remained linked. Due to a lack 
of sufficient competition, and control of a majority of resources, Tanzania can be still 
today be categorised as a de facto single-party state. The creation of a political 
national identity, therefore, hindered the development of a multi-party system by 
fusing the party to the state through political and ideological rhetoric, creating an 
unlevel playing field.  
Though having hindered democratic development, the political national identity, 
based on socialism, self-reliance and unity, can be attributed with providing stability 
and unity to the country. Whilst its neighbours have faced countless ethnic and tribal 
difficulties, Tanzania can be categorised as a politically stable country in an unstable 
region. It is only since the advent of multi-party politics that religious issues have 
started to emerge. There is, therefore, no doubt that Tanzanian nation building 
policies were successful and valuable in that they had a positive impact on political 
stability by joining the population under a common goal for development and 
modernity placed under the traditional understanding of hard work through 
collaboration. The political national identity has allowed Tanzania to experience 
drastic political changes without seriously affecting political stability.  
TANU and CCM’s post-independence political national identity has shaped 
Tanzania’s democratic system in that until recently opposition was weak. CCM built a 
strong support base among the majority rural population who were able to identify 
with its government policies. This widespread appreciation of Ujamaa as well as 
strong unified leadership has created a population that was until recently unwilling to 
change the system in part for fear of ethnic, tribal and religious conflict. Tanzania’s 
political system is now altering. The political national identity is becoming less 
pronounced, mostly because it is outdated within the liberal economic reform and 
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CCM struggles to implement modern policies within its boundaries. A lack of a clear 
modern ideology and refuting interests has created different fractions within the ruling 
party; CCM is no longer the unified party it was a decade ago. Aside from this 
strengthening opposition parties means an increasingly competitive political scene. 
For the foreseeable future, however, it is believed CCM will retain its position as 
ruling party, as a result of its control over resources as well as the deep-rooted support 
for CCM for the moment still present in the rural areas. 
For competitive multi-party politics to succeed and replace the de facto single-party 
state crucially the government and ruling party need to be separated and the political 
national identity rethought197. This may be started with the implementation of the new 
constitution. Perhaps the rejection of a multi-party political system at independence 
and the embracing of it now illustrate that the period since independence and the 
building of a strong political national identity has been necessary. The multi-party 
system was maybe not suited at independence but as the country evolved so has the 
suitability of multi-party politics. The role of CCM and the associated creation of a 
political national identity were unavoidable and necessary for the creation a stable 
unified state. Even though the political national identity hampered the development of 
a multi-party state during and immediately after the transition, it has also aided the 
development in the long-term. The political national identity has provided the 
preconditions and building-blocks for a long-term sustained democracy and a state 
that is able to go through massive political transitions, as is occurring in Tanzania 
today, without a complete disintegration of the political system.   
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